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persuasive than flight. In some cases, greater or less strength was to be found in the source of the information, and in others greater or less strength was to be found in the observations of the officers. In all the cases, of course, alternative innocent explanations of what was observed could have been hypothesized, e.g., the surreptitious handing over of an envelope could, of course, be innocent. But the mere possibility of an innocent explanation for what was observed is not the test of probable cause; innocence can be conjectured or devised for virtually any act or movement. The test is a prudent evaluation of the totality of elements. See supra, pp. 20–23. We submit that the combination of circumstances here adds up to sufficient probable cause for arrest. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 28, 31; Rodgers v. United States, 267 F. 2d 79 (C.A. 9); Christensen v. United States, 259 F. 2d 192 (C.A. D.C.); United States v. Garnes, 258 F. 2d 530 (C.A. 2); Shepherd v. United States, 244 F. 2d 750 (C.A. D.C.), reversed on other grounds sub nom. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301; United States v. Naples, 192 F. Supp. 23 (D. D.C.), pending on appeal, C.A. D.C., No. 16436.
3. The arrest of Toy was not rendered unlawful by the absence of affirmative evidence that the officer(sic)s(sic) stated his purpose to arrest him.
Petitioners contend (Pet. Br. 9) that the absence of affirmative evidence that the officer stated his purpose to arrest Toy brought the case within the prohibition of Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301.
