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there." This query, which went unanswered, is on its face inconsistent with knowledge. * * *
Here, there was no such query by Toy—he slammed the door and ran as soon as he knew he was confronted by a narcotic agent, without giving the. agent an attempt to explain his purpose.
This case is governed, not by Miller, but by the authorities referred to in Miller as the basis for a possible exception. The forcing of entry here was necessary and lawful. In People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, referred to in Miller (supra, p. 34), the court said (p. 306):
[S]ince the demand and explanation requirements of section 844 are a codification of the common law, they may reasonably be interpreted as limited by the common law rules that compliance is not required if the officer's peril would have been increased or the arrest frustrated had he demanded entrance and stated his purpose. (Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166, 170 [10 Am. Dec. 110]; see Rest., Torts, § 206, com. d.). Without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the spur of the moment, the officer must decide these questions in the first instance. When, as in this case, he has reasonable grounds to believe a felony is being committed and hears retreating footsteps, the conclusion that * * * the felon would escape if he demanded entrance and explained his purpose, is not unreasonable. * * * [Emphasis added.]
It was not until Toy's flight that the officer undertook to arrest Toy, and Toy's flight prevented the officer's advising him in specific words that he was to be ar-
631490—62——4
