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procedural rules, and this is true even where the procedure it creates does not conflict with already existing court procedure. Id., 308 S.W.3d at 141.
Section 16-114-206 purports to set out the burden of proof that must be met to prevail in a medical-malpractice action. A burden of proof defines and regulates the party's right to recovery and, therefore, constitutes substantive law. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 125 F. Supp. 696 (D.C. Ark. 1954). Pursuant to section 16-114-206(a), where asserted medical negligence lies outside the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff's burden of proof is to show by testimony of "a medical care provider of the same speciality as the defendant," the standard of care for the same type of practice in the same or a similar locality, that the standard was breached, and that as a proximate cause of that breach the plaintiff was injured. However, the phrase at issue, "By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant," does not define rights or duties.[1] It sets qualifications a witness must possess before he or she may testify in court. As a general rule, whether any witness will be allowed to testify is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Williams v. Ingram, 320 Ark. 615, 899 S.W.2d 454 (1995). The authority to decide who may testify and under what conditions is a procedural matter solely within the province of the courts pursuant to section 3 of Amendment 80 and pursuant to the inherent authority of common-law courts. See Ark.
- ↑ Appellees cite Cathey v. Williams, 290 Ark. 189, 718 S.W.2d 98 (1986) for the proposition that this court has already held that section 16-114-206 (Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34.2614 (Supp. 1985)) is substantive law. However, the challenged language was not part of the statute at that time.
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