Breyer, J., dissenting
the International Monetary Fund, Art. IX, §3, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1413, T. I. A. S. No. 1501. UNRRA required members, absent waiver, to accord the organization “the facilities, privileges, immunities, and exemptions which they accord to each other, including… [i]mmunity from suit and legal process.” 2 UNRRA, A Compilation of the Resolutions on Policy: First and Second Sessions of the UNRRA Council, Res. No. 32, p. 51 (1944). And the UN Charter required member states to accord the UN “such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.” Charter of the United Nations, Art. 105, 59 Stat. 1053, June 26, 1945, T. S. No. 993.
These international organizations expected the United States to provide them with essentially full immunity. And at the time the treaties were written, Congress understood that foreign governments normally enjoyed immunity with respect to their commercial, as well as their noncommercial, activities. Thus, by granting international organizations “the same immunity from suit” that foreign governments enjoyed, Congress expected that international organizations would similarly have immunity in both commercial and noncommercial suits.
More than that, Congress likely recognized that immunity in the commercial area was even more important for many international organizations than it was for most foreign governments. Unlike foreign governments, international organizations are not sovereign entities engaged in a host of different activities. See R. Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How We Use It 93 (1994) (organizations do not act with “ ‘sovereign authority,’ ” and “to assimilate them to states… is not correct”). Rather, many organizations (including four of the five I mentioned above) have specific missions that often require them to engage in what U. S. law may well consider to be commercial activities. See infra, at 12.
Nonetheless, under the majority’s view, the immunity of
