Breyer, J., dissenting
1502.
Some of these organizations, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC), themselves believe they do not need broad immunity in commercial areas, and they have waived it. See, e. g., Articles of Agreement of the International Finance Corporation, Art. 6, §3, Dec. 5, 1955, 7 U. S. T. 2214, 264 U. N. T. S. 118 (implemented by 22 U. S. C. §282g); see also 860 F. 3d 703, 706 (CADC 2017). But today’s decision will affect them nonetheless. That is because courts have long interpreted their waivers in a manner that protects their core objectives. See, e. g., Mendaro v. World Bank, 717 F. 2d 610, 614–615 (CADC 1983). (This very case provides a good example. The D. C. Circuit held below that the IFC’s waiver provision does not cover petitioners’ claims because they “threaten the [IFC’s] policy discretion.” See 860 F. 3d, at 708.) But today’s decision exposes these organizations to potential liability in all cases arising from their commercial activities, without regard to the scope of their waivers.
Under the majority’s interpretation, that broad exposure to liability is at least a reasonable possibility. And that being so, the interpretation undercuts Congress’ original objectives and the expectations that it had when it enacted the Immunities Act in 1945.
B
The majority’s opinion will have a further important consequence–one that more clearly contradicts the statute’s objectives and overall scheme. It concerns the important goal of weeding out lawsuits that are likely bad or harmful–those likely to produce rules of law that interfere with an international organization’s public interest tasks.
To understand its importance, consider again that international organizations, unlike foreign nations, are multilateral, with members from many different nations.
