formulate some possible starting points for such policies, putting them forward for expert analysis, political decision making and prompt implementation, along with due public debate and participation.
Bulgarian attitudes and views on the complex set of issues related to Bulgarian policy on the Republic of Macedonia, as well as the relevant aspects of Bulgaria’s relations with third states, especially Greece, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, were formed at various times in history, and thus are the product of various historical realities. As a result, these attitudes and views are inherently contradictory, effectively hindering any attempt to pursue consistent and proactive policies. Moreover, the present conceptual framework fails to reflect the most recent, post-January 1, 2007 situation in which Bulgaria is a member of both NATO and the European Union, while the Republic of Macedonia is not. Owing to these circumstances, the present analysis and the ensuing policy recommendations are based on a new interpretation and re- evaluation, which requires new approaches in certain aspects.
It should be noted that the position of Skopje enjoys better exposure and audibility than the Bulgarian one among decision makers and the general public in Europe, the United States and Canada. Indeed, during the last two decades the Republic of Macedonia has been building its arguments and international public relations efforts on Yugoslav propaganda disseminated in the course of forty-odd years, while during that time Bulgaria remained virtually silent and refrained from seeking support for its position from other nations. Macedonism also benefits from public sympathy in Europe and North America towards the small post-Yugoslav republic, viewed both as an offspring and to some extent a victim of the Cold War victors.
The present pre-accession status of the Republic of Macedonia vis-аvis the EU and NATO offers a unique window of opportunity to set the country’s relations with Bulgaria on a stable and positive basis of good neighbourliness. If this opportunity is missed, Sofia would only find a fairly modest set of means at its disposal to further its cause, while the capabilities of Skopje would expand. Furthermore, even the strongest arguments of Bulgaria would then become intellectually and morally deficient; for while the silence and passivity of this country in the past could find some explanation (if not justification), the ability to pursue a policy of good neighbourly relations is an important criterion for both NATO and EU accession by candidate states such as the Republic of Macedonia, and any further silence on the part of Bulgaria would be interpreted by our allies in NATO and EU, and in the Republic of
