weak minority. It was inexplicable to the subsequent historians of the Arabian State that after the death of Mahomet so many wars were necessary on Arabian soil; they accounted for this fact by a Ridda, an apostasy, from Islām. The death of the prophet was doubtless a reason for secession to all those who had unwillingly followed Mahomet's lead, or who regarded their contracts as void on his death. The majority of those regarded as secessionists (Ahl ar-Ridda) had however previously never been adherents of the religion, and many had not even belonged to the political State of Islām. It has but recently been recognised that an intelligible history of the expansion of the Arabs is only possible by making these wars against the Ridda the starting-point from which the great invasions developed themselves, more from internal necessity than through any wise direction from Medina – undertakings moreover from the enormous extent of which even the optimism of Mahomet would have flinched.
The movement in Arabia had received through the formation of the State of Medina a new and powerful stimulation. Mahomet's campaigns, with their rich booty, had allured many from afar. He had moreover, as a great diplomatist, strengthened the opposition where he could find no direct acknowledgment. His example alone had also its effect. Should not the prophet of the Banū Ḥanīfa, of the Asad, or of the Tamīm be able to do what the Meccan Nabī had done? In this way prophetism gained ground in Arabia, i.e. the tension already existing grew until it neared an outburst. The sudden death of Mahomet gave new support to the centrifugal tendencies. The character of the whole movement, as it forces itself on the notice of the historian, was of course hidden from contemporaries. Arabia would have sunk into particularism if the necessity caused by the secession of the Ahl ar-Ridda had not developed in the State of Medina an energy which carried all before it. The fight against the Ridda was not a fight against apostates; the objection was not to Islām per se but to the tribute which had to be paid to Medina; the fight was for the political supremacy over Arabia; and its natural result was the extension of the dominions of the prophet, not their restoration. With such a distribution of the Arabian element as has been described it was only in the nature of things that the fight must make itself felt moreover beyond the boundaries of Arabia proper.
Only a few of the tribes more nearly connected with Medina recognised the supremacy of Abū Bakr, the others all seceding. Before the news of these secessions reached Medina an expedition, which had been prepared by Mahomet before his death, had already departed for the Syrian border to avenge the defeat at Mu'ta. Medina was therefore quite denuded of troops. A few former allies wished to utilise this precarious position and make a sudden attack on Medina; this however was prevented by Abū Bakr with great energy. Fortunately the expedition
