_5_
l — VHF Receiver, Aircraft Radio Corp , Type 15D with manual instrumentation 1 — UHF Glideslope Receiver, 10 channel, Collins 51V]. 1 — Marker Beacon Receiver, Bendix MNFSB, with Single three—light presentation
PANEL INSTRUMENTS (Assoc1ated With radio, not a complete list )
— Gyro Horizons, electrically operated, Sperry H—S with quick erectors
— Sperry 0—2 Directionaeryro, With magnetic SlaVing
Radio Magnetic Indicator, Bendix 36105, with SWltCh for Omni or Red ADF - Course Selector for Collins Omni
Course Selector for ARC Omni
ID48 Course DeViation Indicator with switching for either set to either indicator
Set Instruments for Zero Reader
Dual ADF Indicator
I.
RJF‘HIHIHIU l 1
pip l
STEERING COMPUTOR
l — Sperry Zero Reader, Z—2 INVERTORS
2 — Leland SE5—2, 1500 VA tfimTHER RADAR
l — Bendix C Band, RDR-lC
Captain John R Dunham, age 41, had a total flying time of 10,577 hours, of which 805 hours had been in B-26's He had flown 51 hours during the 30 days pre— ceding the aoc1dent and had had a rest period of 19 hours and 45 minutes before the final takeoff. Mr. Dunham had been employed by Continental Can Company since January 1952 and hold all FAA certification appropriate for the flight.
Copilot Donald Martin, age 40, had a total flying time of 3,766 hours, of which 1,728 hours had been in B—26's. He had flown 55 hours during the 30 days preceding the accident and his rest period oefore the final flight was 19 hours and 45 minutes. Mr Martin had been employed by Continental Can Since July 1950, and held all FAR certification for the flight
finalisis and ConcluSions
It is apparent that there must have been control difficulty of an undetermined nature This may have been the breakage of a stractaral member or poSSibly a de— formation or bending of a part, preCipitating the dite It also seems logical that this had its inception while the flight uas in severe turbulence only a fee minutes earlier. It is not poss1ble to do more than surmise as to the genesis of tie trouole‘ because a conSiderable number of initial malfunctionings could have resulted in tea aircraft's turn and final plunge. The phySioal evidence recoiered did not reveal the nature of the trouble. The nature of the aircraft's maneuvers prior to the 13. l dive, and their prOXimity to the Marion airport, may su gest an intent to land there; there is no tangible eVidence of this
