The time required for the flight from Philadelphia to the La Guardia range station was 32 minutes including take—off and climb at Philadelphia. The average ground speed for the aircraft was therefore slightly more than 190 mph. In view of the fact that the true airspeed of the fight was less than 160 mph, Capt. Cavalier should have been aware that he was benefitting from a tail wind component of at least 30 mph at 1500 foot. However, he failed to take the wind sufficiently into consideration and, furthermore, testified that he did not check the wind data before or after leaving Philadelphia. Being unfamiliar with the recent synoptic situation, Capt. Cavalier was apparently not able to calculate the condition of the weather at La Guardia and, as a result, after missing the first approach decided on a course of action contrary to that required under the circumstances. There is little doubt that Capt. Cavalier should have had an accurate estimate of the winds from he surface to 1500 foot and that he should have been able to make the adjustments in approach necessary for a safe landing. Had the direct approach to runway 4 been satisfactory, the landing may have been executed safely even under tail wind conditions. But it is apparent that the instrument approaches were inaccurate because he failed to take into consideration winds aloft and that under the conditions imposed by a faulty approach, his decision to land was in error because of adverse surface winds, of which he was not aware.
The selection of alternate airports indicated very poor judgment in company dispatching and pilot flight planning. The trends for the six hours preceding the accident were unmistakably towards lowering ceilings and visibilities in the New York area. Newark airport was already reporting
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