COPY
Mr. Archie W. League
Director
Air Traffic Service
Washington, D. C. 20553
Dear Mr. League:
During our investigation of the Flying Tiger Line accident at San Francisco, California on December 24, 1964, an evaluation was made of pertinent departure procedures.
The facts disclosed by the Board's investigation of the FTL accident Show that Flight 9150 departed runway 28 with an IFR clearance to proceed via the then current Golden Gate Standard Instrument Departure. Following lift-off, the aircraft was identified on radar by the departure controller within one mile from the end of the runway. Shortly after identification was made the aircraft deviated from its course approximately 40 degrees. However, the change in the aircraft's track was not observed by the departure controller at that time. In response to a request from the crew for track information, the controller changed his scope range setting from the 30 miles to the ten mile range in order to obtain more precise information. The aircraft's position became apparent to the controller and the flight was advised that it was left of the course (287° RAD). Seconds later the aircraft impacted Sweeney Ridge at a point four miles west of the airport and about 2½ miles to the left of the desired course to be flown. No acknowledgment for the advisory issued to the flight was received.
Radar vectoring is not provided to an aircraft departing runway 28 via the SID, until the aircraft reaches an altitude of 1500 feet. A study of the terrain west of the airport, and the departure procedures utilized for aircraft proceeding in that direction, (confirmed by Messrs. Peterson and Rebuschaitis of Flight Standards Service) disclosed evidence that standard obstruction clearance from the terrain, vertical or lateral, cannot be achieved insofar as present criteria are concerned.
We recognize the need for continued use of runway 28, and the basis for the SID procedures associated with that runway. The recent changes accomplished by your Agency in the pertinent departure and approach procedures for SFO, which note minimum climb performance required for compliance with SID's, and the note showing that standard obstruction clearance is not provided over the terrain west of the airport, are definite steps toward a safer operation. However, it must also be recognized that "GAP" SID's, as they exist, provide very small margins of safety when we consider the performance data for many of the aircraft operating from the SFO airport.
