Page:CAB Accident Report, Northeast Airlines Flight 801.pdf/13

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Thus, we have a set of conditions closely simulating those of the above-quoted passage. The captain stated that he could not dismiss the possibility of having had an erroneous illusion of altitude and distance due to weather.

Strong, but not violent, deccleration as described by aircraft occupants seems to be convincing evidence that contact with the water was at a speed less than the recommended approach speed of about 140 miles per hour. In fact, it seems unlikely that a modern transport with landing gear extended and carrying 33 passengers could be ditched at 140 miles per hour during a no-wind condition without widespread serious injuries to its occupants.

If we pursue further the hypothesis that Briggs was attempting to make the approach visually, it appears probable that he allowed the aircraft's speed to fall constantly as he eased the control wheel backward. This hypothesis is further strengthened by the nature of the aircraft's damage. The control and rear portions of the underside the fuselage were completely collapsed, whereas the forward portion of the underside of the fuselage had comparatively little damage. This indicates that the aircraft went into the water in approximately the same attitude as does a flying boat under as practically full stall, tail-first touchdown.

Inasmuch as there was no malfunctioning of any kind, it appears that this accident was this result of the series of events as described in the above hypothesis. The prescribed let-down procedures during a standard range approach are rigid. They include control of air speed by appropriate power settings and degree of flag extension. If the air speed had been maintained, the aircraft could have descended to the level of the runway, only on the runway and near its approach and, assuming no change in power