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runway and the glow of the condenser discharge lights. The approach altitude was maintained and instruments were scanned alternately with checks being made through the windshield to approximately the middle marker with the glide slope noted as riding higher and the captain so informed. As it was noted that we were getting increased deflection on the glide slope I looked over and to all appearances the captain had gone off instruments and was in process of completing the approach by visual reference. . . we touched down gently. . . ."
The flight engineer said. ". . . We arrived Dulles Airport with 28,000 pounds of fuel. . . added to a level of 60,700 pounds. . during the approach to 4R at 'JFK' Airport, the VOR localizer and glide slope functions appeared on both #1 and #2 systems. . . all checklist items completed and a bug speed[1] selected for what we estimated sould be maximum gross landing weight. This called for a threshold
speed of 144 knots and both pilots set their 'bugs' accordingly. . . copilot called out on three occasions that we were high on glide slope . . . made contact with the runway and as the captain pulled all power levers to reverse, I advised that we had four lights and 70 per cent followed rapidly by 85-95-100 per cent . . . powerplants responded well and the reverse thrust was symmetrical . . . believe that I could feel the brakes cycle several times . . . runway appeared quite wet. . . ."
The flight crew also stated that they had not experienced any mechanical difficulty with the aircraft prior to the accident. This crew had flown 7.08 hours within the last 24-hours.[2]
All five of the flight attendants plus the five company flight attendants who were traveling non—revenue from San Juan to New York agreed that the approach and touchdown at JFK Airport were normal. The senior flight attendant described the landing as follows' "The landing felt normal but we continued to move rapidly after the sound of reverse thrust and the sensation of hard braking." Another flight attendant stated "We touched down, rolled some and then reverse thrust was applied. The plane dipped to one Side, more reverse thrust was applied.
The captain of the DC-8 that landed approximately one minute ahead of PAA 212 described his approach and landing in part as follows: "Below 300 feet, probably about 250 feet, we entered thin stratus and lost all forward visibility at 200 feet on glidepath boundary and runway lights became Visible . . . I had the impression we were landing down wind . . braking was fair . . . foot thumpers[3]were still warning of slippery surface . . . runway was wet."
Current ATS procedures permit the use of prescribed or normally used runways even though a tail wind component is present, provided the wind is not in excess of four knots. Under such conditions, wind direction and velocity shall be stated.
Following notification of the accident, Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) Systems Maintenance Service personnel performed required ground checks on facility radar
- ↑ Bug speed is a manually operated pointer.
- ↑ Section 40 320(b) of the ClVll Air Regulations prov1des "An air carrier shall not schedule any flight crew member for duty aloft for more than 8 hours during any 24 consecutive hours, unless he is given an intervening rest period at or before the termination of 8 scheduled hours of duty aloft. . . "
- ↑ The foot thumpers indicate to the pilot that the anti-skid system is cycling and warn him to adjust brake pedal force.
