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extreme emergency up to that 40 inches, as a last resort, without giving any further thought than to avoid an accident."
Captain Wright had made three round-trip qualification flights as required by the Civil Air Regulations over the route from Knoxville to Pittsburgh on March 20-21, 22-23, and 25-26, 1941, and had made at least seven round-trip scheduled flights over the route during April. It appeared from his testimony, however, that he was not sufficiently familiar with the terrain in the vicinity of the Charleston Municipal Airport and had not previously acquainted himself with the narrow valley as a possible outlet in case of a power plant failure such as occurred. In fact he stated: "... We do not generally fly in that valley, so I was not familiar with the terrain and the sudden rise, of course, that we encountered." He testified, in effect, that he thought that the character of the terrain into which he was proceeding would require him to fly 15 or 20 miles before reaching the Kanawha River Valley on his return to the airport. As a matter of fact, the small valley extended for less than three miles before it ended in the ridges which were the highest obstructions in Captain Wright's path. If Captain Wright had cleared the ridge on which the accident occurred he would have had to fly only two miles over descending terrain to reach the Kanawha Valley.
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 recognizes "the duty resting upon air carriers to perform their services with the highest possible degree of safety in the public interest."[1] The operations and pilot manuals issued by PCA and in effect at the time of the accident did not contain any instructions to flight personnel as to the amount of
- ↑ Section 601(b).
