-3-
inches hg and almost immediately the rate of descent increased and the aircraft yawed to the right. The aircraft was at an altitude of approximately 75 feet a.g.l. when he observed the No. 3 propeller reverse indicating the light[1] come on and shouted, "No. 3 is in reverse" This shouted warning was concurrent with the application of engine power and was not heard by the captain. None of the other flight crew members saw the reverse light illuminate.
Persons on the ground who witnessed the accident generally agreed that the approach appeared normal until the aircraft reached a point approximately 1/3 of a mile from the airport. It was then observed to settle abruptly and contact the ground several hundred feet short of the runway.
Initial impact occurred in a wheat field, 546 feet from the approach end of runway 21. At this point the aircraft was in a right bank of approximately 15 degrees and aligned slightly to the right of the runway centreline. The aircraft bounced once, then continued through the wheat field on all three landing gears until it struck an earth embankment. 3–1/2 feet high, located 176 feet from the end of the runway. This impact sheared the right main landing gear and the nose gear from the aircraft. The right wing separated from the fuselage when the aircraft contacted the end of the runway. The aircraft slid a distance of 774 feet down the runway, during which time the left main landing gear failed followed by separation of the left wing. The fuselage came to rest on a heading of approximately 270 degrees, 72 feet from the right side of the runway.
A rapid and orderly emergency evacuation was carried out by all passengers and flight crew members through emergency exits and the rear passenger door. Small fires were ignited in the wing and fuselage fuel tanks during the impact sequence but did not reach major proportions until after the aircraft was completely vacated. The fire increased in magnitude and destroyed the fuselage and both wings.
The entire flight control system and all associated hydraulic booster control units were examined; all were capable of normal operation prior to impact. All three landing gears were in the down and locked position; and the wing flaps were symmetrically extended to the full down position at impact. There was no evidence of any aircraft structural or system failure prior to impact.
Examination of the engines revealed no evidence of any operating distress prior to impact; however, a number of discrepancies affecting the airworthiness of the engines were disclosed and are listed as follows.
1. The fire extinguisher manifold to the No. 2 PRT on the No. 2 engine had a wear hole five inches from its outlet.
2. The magneto lead connector plug on the No. 2 engine was not safetied.
3. Connector plugs for the left and right cowl flap actuators on the No. 2 engine were safetied backwards.
- ↑ The L-1049 propeller system contains individual early warning reverse lights which illuminate when the appropriate propeller blade angle is 6 to 8 degrees below the low pitch setting. The reverse lights on N 189S were located in the lower left-hand corner of the center instrument panel.
