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- Power recovery turbine for the No. 2 engine.
- Fuel pump injector L/H - No. 2 engine.
- Ignition distributor L/H - No. 4 engine.
The aforementioned discrepancies were documented in various factual reports. At the public hearing, Standard Airways volunteered an admission that the factual statements accurately portrayed the discrepancies.
Civil Air Regulations also require that the maintenance manual clearly outline the duties and responsibilities of maintenance personnel and that they be acceptable to the Administrator. Standard's Maintenance Organization as set forth in the maintenance manual, was comprised of a Maintenance Coordinator, Maintenance Representative, and a Chief Inspector.
The duties of the Chief Inspector as specified in the manual were that, "The Chief Inspector shall be responsible for all company aircraft and engine records, for compliance with All Civil Air Regulations as regards maintenance, AD notes, and other regulations . . . he shall be responsible for the acceptance or rejection of all work done on company equipment by maintenance contractors, and shall have the authority to accept or reject such work . . . ."
In a letter dated March 27, 1963, the designated Chief Inspector, informed the CAB by letter that as of March 3, 1963, he had been relieved of these duties. From that date until the time of the accident the records do not indicate that a replacement was appointed.
According to the maintenance records the aircraft was certificated by the FAA on August 3, 1962, and the portion of the manual concerning the maintenance organization was approved on December 14, 1962.
On February 18-19, 1963, a MATS inspection team conducted an inspection of Standard's Maintenance Facility at Long Beach, California. FAA inspectors were present during this inspection and the FAA report states in part ". . . Briefly the results of the inspection were satisfactory. Standard's rapid expansion was discussed, as was the carrier‘s expected acquisition of Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., Air Station Facilities. The problem of monitoring maintenance when the aircraft are physically located throughout the United States was also discussed. However, all these were mentioned in the light of what might result if close monitoring of their operation were not maintained, and changes in their maintenance adopted when it became apparent that these changes were needed . . . The only discrepancy that was noted, . . . was that the component time control cards were not being kept up to date . . ."
