_ 5 _
The aircraft was operating in a satisfactory manner until the fire warning shortly after takeoff. The captain had successfully ceped with the emergency, and engines Nos. 1, 3, and 4 were in good operating condition and capable of sustaining the aircraft in properly conducted flight.
The control tower Operators offered their aSSistance to the flight by glVlng them clearancs to land on any of the runways and offering to have the emergency equipment and crew stand by. The flight‘s reJection of the offer to alert the emergency crews indicates they were not extremely concerned for their safety and had the Situation pretty well in hand. It further suggests that the crew was certain there was no actual fire in the No. 2 engine.
For the flight to have made a KedZie localizer approach would have neces— Sltated their climbing to an altitude which would have put them in the overcast and consumed conSiderably more time. Their deClSlon to stay VFR below the clouds was reasonable; however, this did.make it necessary for them to fly at an alti— tude between 400 and 600 feet above the ground.
Analysis of weather conditions eXisting at the time of the accident showed that Flight 595 should not have encountered structural lClng or Significant turbulence during its short flight.
In anticipation of landing, a gear—down, flap—extended configuration was established on the downwind portion of the traffic pattern. The wing flaps were at least in the takeoff peeition of 60 percent and had been allowed, presumably, to remain so extended Since takeoff, because less than one minute had elapsed from start of takeoff roll until the fire warning, and at that time the captain planned to return to land. The track over the ground on the "downwind" curved toward the runway. When the aircraft was peeitioned to start the turn to final approach a sharp turn was needed to av01d overshooting the extended.centerline of runway 31L.
The Board believes the captain attempted such a turn, and in deing so combined a very steep bank with high gross weight and three-engine aircraft configuration in such a manner that the aircraft entered a regime of flight describable as being on the backSide of the power curve. More power and altitude than was available to him was needed to safely recover the aircraft. At some pOint in this turn the captain very probably deCided to discontinue the landing approach and attempted a l‘go—around." Hence, he called for gear up at or near this sane pOint, but for an unexplained reason the Wing flap controls were positioned for flap retraction.
The Board believes an acc1dent such as this is a certainty when at low altitude an exceSSive rate of Sink is compled with the additional loss of lift caused by the Simultaneous retraction of the wing flaps from 60 to 24 percent. The flap setting of 24 percent was their intran51t peeition as the aircraft struck the ground
