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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R00020011022-9

vulnerable are lock-and-dam installations and the shiplifts at Rothensee and Niederlinens; destruction of which would completely close through traffic and cause flooding and restrictive low water levels on the major routes. The simultaneous destruction of the shiplifts and the locks at Niederlinens, Brandenburg, and Eisenhuettenstadt would be of particular consequence—all major routes to Greater Berlin would be closed to through traffic from both east and west. Serious interdiction could also be accomplished in destroying ports, repair facilities, and large bridges.

East Germany's merchant fleet could provide substantial sealift logistical support for military operations. Its cargo ships have a combined lift capability of 818,675 long tons, and its tankers could transport about 2.6 million barrels of petroleum products. The sizable number (74 units) of large-hatch, heavy-lift ships could be used extensively to replenish supplied for deployed armed forces as well as to provide sealift capability for delivering all known Communist military hardware. The fleet's passenger carrying ships would lift about 1,500 troops under emergency conditions, and the fleet's four ferries could be used to transport about 8,500 troops on a very short-haul basis. Additionally, with slight modifications the 23 fishing vessels in the fleet totaling 87,925 g.r.t. and 51,955 d.w.t. could be converted to military use. Three of East Germany's major maritime ports—Rostock, Wismar, and Stralsund—are the most favorably suited for military logistic use and have a combined estimated military port capacity of 74,500 tons. Rostock, the largest and best equipped, is by far the most suitable, but all three have substantial wharfage for handling military cargo, and each is cleared by several standard-gage rail lines and several hard-surfaced roads. Sassnitz and Peenemuende, the two remaining major ports, are less than ideal for such operations, not being general-cargo ports and more limited in clearance facilities.

The two largest ports, Rostock, and Wismar, if used as terminals in an east-west maritime movement of Warsaw Pact forces, would permit supplying such forces operating in northern East Germany directly from Soviet Baltic or Soviet inland-waterway ports.

Rostock is the principal supply port for Soviet forces in East Germany. Soviet vessels unload supplies at a military terminal in the Unter Warrgau Harbor and at deep-draft wharves in the Overseas Harbor.

FIGURE 1. Soviet forces moving near Berlin, armor on the Outer-Ring railroad line and a truck convoy on the south ring of the Berlin autobahn (C)

The principal disadvantage of East German ports in a military operation is their vulnerability to interdiction. Rostock has a narrow harbor entrance and Wismar, Stralsund, and Peenemuende all have long and relatively narrow approach channels. Sassnitz is not restricted by an approach channel but does depend on a combination rail-highway bridge for clearance from the island of Ruegen to the mainland.

The civil-air carrier INTERFLUG could provide limited troop and cargo transport services in support of military operations. This support, however, is totally dependent upon provision of supplies and aircraft maintenance services in the U.S.S.R. Many of INTERFLUG's skilled aviation personnel are members of the military reserve. East German airfields are distributed throughout the country but are concentrated mainly in the south; facilities are adequate for routine operations.

The telecom systems could adequately support military requirements. Total disruption of services by military action would be difficult because of the many facilities available for alternate routing; however, unattended radio-relay repeater stations and junction points in the underground cable networks are vulnerable to sabotage. In wartime, complete military control of the telecom facilities would prevail.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R00020011022-9