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Friends of Children Society (merged in 1971). After 1956, aid from abroad, dispensed either by various organizations such as the Jewish Relief Committee or received in the form of individual packages and remittances, constituted a sizable part of private welfare activity. In addition, U.S. Government donations of surplus food were distributed by three U.S. charitable agencies: CARE, Church World Service, and American Relief for Poland. This last program, which had been in operation since 1957 and resulted in the distribution of several million pounds of food, was phased out by 1969.
Several mass organizations, theoretically independent but actually controlled by the government, provide recreational facilities and limited welfare services for its members. The Polish Red Cross does not formally conduct welfare work, but together with civil defense organizations it gives training in first aid and renders material aid to victims of natural disasters.
3. Social problems (C)
a. Social strains
The unprecedented social dislocations of World War II and the subsequent advent of totalitarian Communist rule caused or intensified most of the country's social problems. Apart from the heavy losses of both individual and national property, the unparalleled losses in population included a high proportion of the political, social, intellectual, and moral elite upon whom postwar social reconstruction would have normally depended. The disruption of the traditionally strong Polish family was severe; the average family lost at least one member. Moreover, the general futility of resisting the organized atrocities of the occupying Nazi regime fostered cynicism toward all social order. This cynicism, together with theft and mendacity, were considered commendable traits among those who did resist the wartime occupation. For most, it continued to be an asset during the immediate postwar period of political violence and social lawlessness which accompanied the advent of Communist rule. Among many—but not all—members of the older generation and among most of the younger generation, the miasma of totalitarian rule and its unresponsiveness to public opinion fostered a continuing disrespect for the concept of property and social order. During the 1960's, crime and social conflict emerged as an issue not only between the regime and the population in general, but between those members of the older generation who as a reaction to the past put a premium on law and order and those, mainly the youth, who tended to equate defense of freedom with resistance to all authority.
The years between the consolidation of the Communist government and the beginning of the post-Stalinist period in 1954 brought few significant improvements in economic and political conditions upon which the reestablishment of stable behavioral standards could be based. Many people lost what remained of their property through confiscation; numerous families were disrupted by the political imprisonment of one or more of their members; and a great many formerly acceptable modes of behavior were prosecuted as acts against the state. Rapid industrialization brought large numbers of young peasants into the overcrowded cities, creating a serious problem of personal adjustment and morals. The entry of large numbers of women into the labor force disrupted established family patterns even more, with particularly serious consequences for the traditional patriarchal society. Moral leadership, except from the persecuted Roman Catholic Church, was virtually nonexistent.
The curbing of police terror at the end of the Stalin era and the initial exuberance of the population over the installation of Gomulka in 1956 resulted in an increased incidence of politically and economically motivated antisocial behavior. After 1957, the retrogressive political, economic, and social policies of the government resulted in turn in a growing party among the people in general and of a resistance to "socialist" moral values among the youth. Widespread apathy and cynicism were manifested outwardly by disrespect for authority, alcoholism, corruption, and low moral standards.
Nevertheless, there was, especially among the young people, a general search for new social principles and values that would help Poland to become a truly modern, efficient, technological society. This search was accompanied by the belief that fundamental reform of the Communist order was needed. This, in turn, contributed to the existing alienation between the generations and to existing social strains that increasingly assumed political overtones.
By the late 1960's longstanding grievances over the regime's political and cultural policies were being voiced more openly, foreshadowing the simmering unrest that was to explode in December 1970. The disorders and violence in early 1968 by a coalition of students and intellectuals began largely as a spontaneous expression of genuine grievances in the academic milieu and related issues of individual liberty. The more fundamental cause, however, was the pent-up pressure of Polish youth for recognition,
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