APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9
opinion present no problem for Gierek. He has, in fact, given measured encouragement to "creative unrest" and "constructive dissatisfaction" as needed catalysts for change. Yet popular expectations in this era of slackening East-West tensions almost certainly exceed the regime's ability to fulfill them. There will be many Poles, even among those who now have faith in Gierek's good intentions, who will be inclined to view any slowdown in his course as an abandonment of his entire program. And any consequent shirking of effort or open demonstrations of protest could make this a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Gierek himself may recognize the need for continuing change. For one thing, his present efforts to imbue his countrymen with a Germanic work ethic may not suffice to overcome the remaining shortcoming in Poland's existing economic mechanism. But he will have to content with forces of inertia - born, ironically, of his initial successes - within the PUWP, with still powerful vested interests in the political and economic bureaucracy who feel that passive resistance to Gierek's reforms will permit them to outlast even this latest threat to their sinecures, and last, but not least, with Moscow.
Indeed, the future direction of the Polish experiment will unquestionably continue to depend heavily on the mood of the Kremlin. Gierek's success in restoring domestic order and his care not to maneuver very far from Moscow's position on basic foreign policy issues have won him the respect and the unqualified public endorsement of the top Soviet leaders. Even so, he has shown great caution in assessing the limits of Soviet tolerance of economic and political change - and apparently with good cause. The Soviets are reported to have warned Gierek - directly and through trusted intermediaries - of their displeasure with certain of his moves. Their concern has apparently centered on his agricultural and religious policies as well as on his personnel changes.
There is nothing to success that the Soviets are at present really alarmed - much less than they might be considering some dramatic move to bring Gierek to heel. Nevertheless, the Kremlin's persistent ideological orthodoxy gives heart to like-minded bureaucrats in Poland and generally complicates the Warsaw regime's task in trying to maintain the momentum of its reforms. Thus it would appear that Gierek will long have to continue to display considerable firmness and skill in dealing with the Soviet leadership in order to prevent its unimaginative views from frustrating his efforts to improve the material lot of his countrymen or from otherwise suffocating his campaign to rejuvenate the Polish nation.
The Palace of culture in Warsaw, Stalin's gift to Poland, this towering building serves as a constant reminder of the Kremlin's influence on Polish affairs.'
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9
