APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9
extend his housecleaning campaign to the lower echelons of the party and government and to advance the scheduled date for the 6th PUWP Congress a full year to December 1971. And when that carefully prepared meeting was convened, he used it both to effect further key personnel changes and to enshrine the basic features of his political and economic policies in the new PUWP program. (C)
In many ways 1972 was an even more encouraging year for the Poles. Their country emerged from the 6th PUWP Congress and from the governmental elections a few months later with the youngest and best educated leadership of any Warsaw Pact nation. Comprised largely of individuals who began their political or professional careers in the postwar period, Gierek's new team shared his pragmatism, his commitment to a new relationship between the rulers and the ruled, and his concern for popular welfare. Moreover, by year's end Gierek could cite an impressive array of actions and accomplishments to substantiate his claim that Poland was not "one the right road" and to show that his policies were indeed serving his declared objectives of promoting domestic prosperity and of making Poland "count in the world." Among other things, increases in agricultural production, real wages, and industrial productivity had exceeded initial forecasts. In the field of foreign affairs, Poland had not only clearly regained its leading position among Moscow's partners in Eastern Europe, but had succeeded in forging promising new political and economic links to the West as well. (C)
Despite the fact that Gierek has won most of his initial battles, however, final victory in his struggle to revive the Polish nation is still far away. As underscored by the rejection of his proposed new labor code by the trade union congress held in November 1972, he is still very much on probation as far as most of Poland's workers are concerned. Their continued support seems likely to depend on further tangible improvements - social, political, and particularly, material - in their way of life. Yet Gierek's ability to deliver may be limited by a number of factors, not the least of which is his seemingly rather conservative position on the need for major institutional reforms within Poland's existing economic system. (S)
Indeed, the key to Gierek's ultimate success or failure probably lies in the economic field. The Polish people know that he is no liberal and that his programs promise no miracles. At the same time, however, part of the bargain he has offered them rests on the promise that hard work and dedication will be suitable rewarded. Hence, failure to maintain a steady and relatively substantial rate of economic progress would greatly complicate Gierek's efforts to achieve a delicate balance between seemingly contradictory objectives - for example, popular mobilization and discipline versus a freer internal atmosphere; Party supremacy versus a democratized and decentralized governmental system; and strong, responsible one-man management versus increased worker participation in the decision making process. (S)
Thus, while Gierek has entered into his third year in office in a rather favorable position, the situation which he faces is still too complex - and his long range plans as yet too vaguely defined - to permit any confident judgement as to just how smooth or rocky Poland's new path to socialism may turn out to be. But it is possible to review the internal and external factors - including the influence of history and geography - which affect Gierek's options, to assess his specific moves and policies in the light of the problems he inherited from the Gomulka era, and to identify areas of possible future difficulty. (S)
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070027-9
