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refined. The major change was the creation, in 1969, of an inner executive of the council, known as the Presidium of the Government. The Presidium is headed by the Premier and comprises all the deputy premiers, the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, and, in 1973, the Minister of Science, Higher Education, and Technology.
Until late 1964, there had existed the Economic Council of the Council of Ministers, a high-level research body created during the more heady liberal atmosphere of 1957 to study and make recommendations on Poland's economic system. The disappearance of the Economic Council without fanfare in 1964 appeared to confirm reports that its liberal and far-reaching recommendations clashed with the orthodox economic views of Gomulka. Such residual practical functions as this organ still had by 1964 were transferred to the then existing Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers (KERM), headed by the Premier, as well as to the State Planning Commission. When the KERM was abolished in 1969, the newly created Presidium assumed its functions.
The concept of a government Presidium in Poland is not new. Prior to 1956 the Council of Ministers never met as a body, and all executive power was concentrated in its core of ranking Communist leaders also known as the Presidium. With the change of regime in October 1956, measures for some decentralization and "democratization" of state institutions changed the mode of operations of the Council of Ministers; the Presidium lost its separate institutional identity and power, while the council itself was reduced in size and began to hold regular sessions. The Presidium created in 1969 is not wholly analogous to its historical counterpart. Under Gomulka, its functions were largely limited to the economic sphere; moreover, these functions were primarily those of coordination previously exercised jointly by the abolished KERM and the existing State Planning Commission, while most of the formerly detailed responsibilities of these two bodies for economic policy implementation were transferred to appropriate ministries and, in some instances, to groups of horizontally organized industrial "associations." The Presidium's main role, therefore, became the supervision of regime efforts to streamline working responsibilities in the economic area without jeopardizing central control over policymaking.
The Gierek regime has retained this basic structure and its main purpose generally intact; indeed, the new regime's innovations have been few in the area of structural reform of institutions, especially in the area of the economy. Instead, it is focusing its attention on new staffing, "energizing" the system, and improving its lines of responsibility and individual initiative on the working levels. The Presidium of the Government, however, while retaining its primary economic orientation, showing signs of functioning additionally as a genuine intermediary between the cabinet and the government bureaucracy on the one hand, and the legislature - and through it, the people - on the other, i.e., as a representative of the government structure as a whole.
Despite Gierek's evident intent gradually to enhance the prestige and responsibilities of the government machinery within the regime as a whole, the controlling role of the party is unquestioned. Though Gierek does not hold any position within the government (unlike Gomulka who was a member of the Council of State), the practice of interlocking some high party and government positions (which was never as blatant in Poland as in some other Eastern European countries) remains a prominent feature of the system. In 1972, the Premier, a deputy premier, the Chairman of the Planning Commission who was also a deputy premier, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of National Defense, and the Chairman of the Council of State were full members of the party Politburo.
Although the feature of interlocking appointments is retained, the party's control over key areas of foreign and domestic policies is by no means dependent on this practice. Gierek's firm hold over the party-government apparatus as a whole guarantees such control with or without governmental portfolios being held by key Politburo members. Despite this ultimate control over all aspects of policymaking and close supervision over policy implementation, a major feature of the Gierek regime's modus operandi is its emphasis on the utilization of expertise, whether it be found within or outside the party. Indeed, one of the regime's highly publicized practices has been the incorporation of non-party experts into various positions in government agencies previously occupied by party hacks. A newly reinstituted practice of holding joint Politburo-cabinet meetings has been supplemented by bringing into such sessions experts who are members of neither body.
This more freewheeling, pragmatic, and goal-oriented approach that tends to disregard orthodox practice is also reflected in the creation of numerous new ad hoc and semi-permanent advisory bodies loosely attached either to the Council of Ministers or the party and composed of party and non-party experts as well as laymen directly concerned with the problems at hand. These include such bodies as a
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