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predecessors and other Eastern European elites. Nowhere are the differences in the characteristics of the Gierek and the Gomulka regimes more apparent than in the contrast of the personalities of the two leaders themselves. Gomulka's initial political flexibility was soon neutralized by his need to counter intra-party maneuvering, and by his inherent authoritarianism, taciturn nature, and heated temperament. He was largely ignorant and distrustful of the West, which he visited only once when he and other Communist leaders traveled to the United Nations in 1960. Finally, although Gomulka was a skilled politician to a fault, he was reluctant to delegate authority and had none of the expertise to understand the economic and social needs of a developing technological society. By contrast, Gierek had established a reputation as an efficient economic administrator and tough party boss in industrial Silesia long before he became a national leader. A former miner, Gierek was long active in the Communist movements, first in France, and then in Belgium where he spent the war years. His manner is straightforward and sincere, and although he is far from being a political liberal, he believes in listening to the views of his subordinates as well as in issuing orders. Above all, Gierek's approachability, pragmatism, and stated dedication to a just reward for hard work are the same qualities that earned him the respect of Silesia's industrial workers during his 13-year tenure there.
As a group, the new Polish leadership is the only one in Eastern Europe in which the postwar generation predominates. Most of the new leaders are not products of the "revolutionary" tradition, the resistance movement, or Soviet training, but rather of the universities and educational institutions of Communist Poland. Few have suffered for their beliefs and ideological misdemeanors either during the Stalinist or the post-1956 periods. At the same time, however, they have witnessed two major political upheavals that must affect their outlook. Although the impact of 1956 on them may be remote, they undoubtedly are not unaffected by the developments of the 1960s when Poland in effect stood still because of the fundamentalism of Gomulka's views.
Although all 20 members of the Politburo and Secretariat served in some capacity under Gomulka, the vast majority attained their present positions on or since 20 December 1970 when Gierek became party leader. This applies to eight of the 11 full members of the Politburo, all four candidate Politburo members, seven of the eight secretaries (including Gierek), and all three "members" of the Secretariat (a new category created at the December 1971 Party Congress). The only leaders whose positions antedated December 1970 are Gierek, a Politburo member since 1959, Jozef Tejchma and Wladyslaw Kruczek, Politburo members since 1968, and Jan Szydlak, a secretary since 1968.
Perhaps the most striking features of the new leadership are its low average age and high educational qualifications. Of the 20 top leaders, 15 are in their 40s, with the average age being 48.3; in the Politburo this figure stands at 49.7, and in the Secretariat at 46.4. In education, five of the 20 leaders hold doctorates, eight have master's degrees, and three have degrees from technical, teaching, and military academies; the remaining four members of the leadership studied at least 2 years at party higher schools. Although the academic legitimacy of some of the degrees may be questionable, and although Gierek is not the youngest party leader in Eastern Europe (in 1973 Gierek was 60, but Romania's Ceaucescu, at 55, was the youngest), both the educational status and the general youth of the Polish leadership is unequaled in Communist Europe.
The party careers of the members of the leadership group are remarkably similar. Almost all joined the party between 1945 and 1953; only two of them (Gierek and Kruczek) were party members prior to World War II. Communist youth organizations provided the first major executive positions for 13 of the 20 leaders, with most of them subsequently moving into the apparatus of the party proper. Indeed, the party has been the principal proving ground for two-thirds of the present leaders, 14 of whom developed their careers in the central or regional party organizations. The other six members of the leadership owe their advancement to the top to long service in the government, such as veteran economist, Premier Jaroszewicz, Defense Minister Jaruzelski, and former security official Szlachcic.
Another notable common characteristic of the present leadership is its general exposure to countries and systems other than its own. Gierek himself lived more than 20 years in Western Europe, and all the members of the ruling group have traveled abroad during the postwar period. Although much of this travel was within the Soviet orbit, 17 of the 20 leaders also visited non-Communist countries, mostly in Western Europe, on one or more occasion.
Despite the common characteristics of the Gierek leadership, it is not a colorless collective. It contains professional party apparatchiks such as Babiuch and Szydlak; economic specialists such as Jagielski and Jaroszewicz; ideologues and academics; regional party leaders; representatives of "law and order" populism;
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