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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7


FIGURE 6. Headquarters of the PZPR Central Committee, Warsaw (U/OU) (picture)


the Central Committee remains theoretical; none of these bodies in fact have decisive power genuinely to elect delegates to the next higher body, because acceptable candidates are in fact chosen from above. Even the plenary sessions of the Central Committee, which average two or three a year, are called at the pleasure of the party leadership. The real locus of power thus remains in the Politburo, which formulates party policies, and in the Secretariat, which implements them through the appropriate departments of the Central Committee apparatus. In practice, therefore, power flows downward from the Politburo on a continuing basis through its control over subordinate party bodies at all levels.

A major feature of both the party crisis of 1968 and that of December 1970 was a breakdown of the practical flow of power downward and the attempted reassertion by the membership and the party apparatus of the theoretical principles of rule from below. Although Gomulka, after temporarily reasserting his position in 1968, failed to heed the lesson this implied, Gierek has shown signs that while keeping the helm of the party firmly in the hands of its leaders, he intends to give its membership and the apparatus a greater voice in the running of daily affairs, establish a permanent dialog between the upper and lower echelons, and make the regional organizations more responsive to the opinions of their members. For example, the changes in the party statutes adopted at the Sixth Congress lay a much greater stress than hitherto on the responsibility of party organs at all levels to keep their members informed, and to report to them periodically on the organization's activities. New provisions for the "recall" of leading functionaries of such organizations have been included in the statutes. Moreover, the word "election" rather than "appointment" is used with respect to the process of selecting the executive organs of party organizations at all levels. As a result, the Central Committee, for example, is charged with "electing" instead of "appointing" the Politburo, a change implying at once a new responsibility of the Politburo to the Central Committee and the possibility, still remote if not unthinkable, of a non-unanimous vote for the top leadership of the party.

Requirements for membership in the party have been somewhat tightened by the new statute, reflecting Gierek's priority of competence, effectiveness, and dedication over sheer number. Although membership remains open to all persons over 18 years of age, all applicants under the age of 24 (hitherto age 21) are admitted "as a rule" from among deserving members of the mass youth organizations. An applicant must be nominated by a party member in good standing who has known him for at least 3 (hitherto 2) years. Upon acceptance, he serves 2 (hitherto 1) years in the status of a candidate member before being endowed with full membership (essentially the right to elect and to be elected to party posts). In addition, new sanctions are provided in the statute against wrongdoers in the party, especially against members who hold elective positions in the local government machinery.

Membership figures of the PZPR reveal the impact of the several crises that have affected the party. In late 1956, the rank and file was in greater disarray than at any time in the postwar period. Reduction in the size of the party apparatus in 1957 made it less unwieldy, but the subsequent "verification" campaign (screening of party membership) of 1957-1958 and the exchange of party cards in 1959 led to a significant drop in total party membership, and it was not until the early 1960s that it again reached the pre-1956 totals. Thereafter, until 1967, membership climbed steadily as the attractiveness and necessity of party membership for opportunistic reasons increased, and as the party itself put greater stress on organizational and recruiting activity.

In mid-1965 the party decided gradually to revalidate all party membership cards issued prior to 1960. This decision was accompanied by some indications that the party wished to ease up on its recruitment drive and enter a period of retrenchment designed to stress ideological quality. Although party sources simultaneously stressed that the exchange of membership cards would not be accompanied by a "verification" campaign similar to that of a decade earlier, the dissension and turmoil which burst out among the rank and file after the Arab-Israel war of


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7