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mutual relations the Polish regime continued to permit a US presence in Poland far exceeding that permitted by any other Communist country.
Gomulka's basic belief that Poland's foreign policy interests not only must, but should, rest on active membership in the "socialist alliance" headed by the Soviet Union is clearly shared by his successor. Despite, and indeed, also because of the domestic upheaval that accompanied Edward Gierek's assumption of power in December 1970, the new party leader immediately made clear his regime's commitment to continuity in foreign policy and ideological fealty to the USSR. As the immediate domestic crisis that he inherited began to recede, however, Gierek embarked on a foreign policy which was markedly more active than that pursued by his predecessor. It has been based on a thorough pursuit of Poland's national self-interest, especially in, but not confined to, expended economic relations with the West.
This new activism does not signify that Poland under Gierek is intent on testing or straining its bonds with the USSR, but rather it is a measure of the new climate of Eastern European-Soviet relations that has gradually evolved, and which Gierek is exploiting to a fuller measure than would have Gomulka. In doing so, Gierek is the beneficiary of two major factors that became operative after the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact powers. First, he has inherited a new domestic confidence and a feeling of greater security resulting from the conclusion of the Polish-West German treaty, which in Polish eyes firmly established the territorial integrity of the postwar Polish state. Secondly, he can function within the framework of considerably more open Soviet policies rooted in Moscow's drive toward detente with the West. The logic of the evolution of Eastern European-Soviet relations as a result of Moscow's impulse toward detente evidently underscores Gierek's conviction that Poland - as the second largest power within the Soviet orbit - can exercise greater independence of action provided that this is done within the framework of the Warsaw Pact alliance and not outside it - i.e., that it does not contravene basic Soviet strategic interests in the area. Indeed, Gierek seems to be tapping these impulses which existed in Poland even in Gomulka's last years - and which Gomulka resisted - toward the more vigorous assertion of Poland's national interests within the Soviet bloc.
It is too early in Gierek's tenure and in the process of his consolidation for him or for foreign observers to speculated on what possible leverage vis-a-vis Moscow Poland might actually attain. Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership's benevolent attitude toward Gierek from the very beginning has contained some elements of appeasement as well as being a genuine expression of confidence in Gierek's ability to restore domestic stability and protect Soviet interests in Poland This is not to say that the Soviet commitment to Gierek is ultimately any greater than it was to Gomulka; indeed, the Soviet commitment appears to have been always first to domestic stability in Poland and compatibility of Polish and Soviet foreign policy, and only then, by derivation, to a Polish leader who could guarantee those conditions. While Gomulka fulfilled these stipulations, he was treated as "first among equals" in bloc councils and enjoyed bountiful Soviet support; when he failed in December 1970, he found himself abandoned by Moscow, whose support moved to Gomulka's more capable successor. Since then, Soviet trust in Gierek's ability to fulfill Moscow's desiderata has been demonstrated by his inheritance of Gomulka's mantle within the bloc. On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union in December 1972, for example, Gierek was given pride of place among other Warsaw Pact party leaders, all of whom - with the exception of East Germany's Honecker - are senior to him in tenure. Such demonstrative Soviet gestures, however, are unlikely to blind Gierek to the fact that Soviet trust, and the expanded room for indigenous policy moves that comes with it, remains contingent on the Soviet assessment of the effectiveness of his stewardship of the Polish state.
As is the case in all policy formulation, the determination of foreign policy is the prerogative of the Communist party Politburo. Policies that have a direct bearing on the interests of other ruling Communist parties are generally handled by the appropriate section of the party's Secretariat. Other aspects of policy, such as all policy toward the non-Communist world, are implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite the existence of a parliamentary committee of foreign affairs, there is no true foreign policy debate in the Western sense, nor does the governmental apparatus as a whole play a role in the formulation of policy. As a result, the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs in Poland has been intrinsically no more important than is the case in most other Communist countries. Whatever prestige has accrued to the incumbent at any one time has generally been the result of his being simultaneously a member of the party Politburo rather than from his ministerial portfolio. One possible exception was the late Adam Rapacki, who headed the Foreign Ministry from April 1956 to December 1968 and who gained a
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