APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7
shift of the Polish state was Soviet sponsored, and the USSR remained for years - until 1959 when General de Gaulle expressed French support for Poland - the only great power participant in the Potsdam Conference that supported Polish claims to the permanent retention of the so-called Western, or "Regained," Territories. Soviet support on this issue was thus vital to any postwar Polish government, since the state would have been neither politically nor economically viable without the former German territories.
Most importantly, however, the legally provisional nature of nearly one-third of the postwar Polish state nurtured profound psychological strains among the people which were exploited by the Communist leaders. The conclusion of the Polish-West German treaty - whose border provisions are viewed as "final" by Warsaw and, despite qualifications with regard to the continuing four-power responsibilities for Germany as a whole, have been welcomed by the West - has eased these popular strains in Poland. The eventual impact of the disappearance of this psychological factor on Polish-Soviet relations and on Poland's role in Europe is as yet difficult to gauge.
The fact that Gierek came to power with Soviet support and not in the face of Soviet hostility - as did Gomulka in 1956 - has conditioned the Polish-Soviet relationship since December 1970. Although Moscow neither engineered the change of regime neither dictated the Polish party's decisions leading up to it, it publicly supported Gierek within hours of Warsaw's announcement of the change of leadership. Formal endorsement of the new Polish team by the Soviet leadership came during an inaugural trip by Gierek and Premier Jaroszewicz to Moscow on 5 January 1971. A month later, the USSR extended badly needed hard currency credits to the new Polish regime, enabling the latter to rescind Gomulka's price increases and quell a dangerous, second wave of strikes that threatened to spread throughout the country. Moscow's positive assessment of Gierek's ability to handle the situation was subsequently reflected in Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Brezhnev's speech to the 24th Soviet Party Congress on 30 March 1971, when the Soviet leader expressed "deep satisfaction that fraternal Poland has overcome the difficulties which arose there." With public order and regime control progressively restored in Poland, Moscow's realistic appreciation of Gierek's leadership as probably the best one under the circumstances appeared to be vindicated. In December 1971, Brezhnev made a personal appearance at the Sixth Congress of the PZPR to signify his approval of
FIGURE 13. Polish leaders' inaugural trip to Moscow, 5 January 1971. From left: Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev, Edward Gierek, Soviet Premier Aleksey Kosygin, and Polish Premier Poitr Jaroszewicz. (U/OU) (picture)
Gierek's course. A year later, as noted, Gierek's status as "first among equals" in Eastern Europe was demonstrated by the Soviet leadership during the observances of the 50th anniversary of the Soviet Union in Moscow.
The Soviets' stress on their non-involvement in the Polish crisis, their low-key handling of the change of regime, and their subsequent quick public support - behavior which was undoubtedly in large part conditioned by an unwillingness to risk derailing the movement towards detente in Europe - did not mean, however, that the Kremlin leaders embraced the new Polish team - without reservations. Although both Gierek and Jaroszewicz were known in Moscow and were clearly acceptable, they were, after all, behaving in unorthodox ways in Poland that Moscow could hardly wish other Communist countries to emulate. Statements by Soviet officials during the first months of 1971 clearly showed that Moscow was anxiously watching Gierek's evolving views on the role of the party, on the party's relations with the people, and on the role of Polish nationalism. The appointment in March 1971 of a new Soviet ambassador to Poland, Stanislav Pilatovich, a former secretary of the Belorussian party organization who reportedly knows Polish, was probably at least in part designed to show that Moscow wished to keep close touch with the Polish situation. The Gierek regime's success in overcoming Moscow's initial reserve probably was not only a result of Polish concessions and mutual compromises, but also of the character of the new Polish leadership. Gierek's team appeared from the
47
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7
