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airing of Western views on European problems in the Polish press.
The Gierek regime has also continued the established policy of active development of relations with the non-Communist developing countries although never to the detriment of the predominantly European focus of its foreign policy. Relations with the developing countries, often accompanied by sizable credits, have generally been governed by considerations of economic advantage. Results for Poland in this respect have been uneven, and sometimes disappointing, and have caused some shifts of emphasis. For example, in the early 1970s Poland continued to redirect its interests from some African countries to those of Latin America both in diplomatic and economic terms.
Since Gierek came to power, reciprocal moves by Warsaw and Washington to bring about a thaw in the generally cool climate that prevailed in US-Polish relations during the last years of Gomulka's rule have resulted in some of the most publicly visible, significant, and popularly welcomed developments in Polish foreign policy since December 1970. Here too, Gierek's efforts were hindered as well as helped by the legacy of the Gomulka era.
Poland and the United States have maintained full diplomatic relations throughout the postwar period, and after 1956 the Gomulka regime attempted to expand those economic and cultural contacts which it considered beneficial. This was true despite the wide fluctuations in political relations which were particularly marked during the peak of the Vietnam conflict in the second half of the 1960s. In 1959 Poland and the United States agreed to the opening of consulates in Poznan and Chicago. In December 1960 the United States restored the most-favored-nation clause to bilateral trade with Poland, in part as a result of the successful settlement of postwar US nationalization claims against the Polish Government. Despite being periodically jeopardized by political strains, the most-favored-nation clause in large degree helped Poland to achieve a favorable and rising balance of trade with the United States. At the same time it permitted Poland to maintain scheduled repayments of sizable US credits extended in the decade following 1957. The bulk of these credits, amounting to a total of about US$500 million, were designated for the purchase of surplus US agricultural commodities, mainly grain. After long negotiations, Poland agreed in April 1967 to the utilization by the United States of a portion of the so-called counterpart funds (Polish currency credited to the United States and ultimately convertible into dollars) for "mutually beneficial" projects in Poland. Hopes for a future expansion of the relatively large number of official and private exchange programs and research projects operating between the two countries were cut short by Polish indecisiveness and by the general chill in relations that accompanied Poland's internal crisis in 1968 as well as its participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The year 1968, coinciding also with the peak US involvement in the Vietnam conflict, was thus one of particularly strained US-Polish relations, especially on the working level.
During 1969, Poland's deliberate diplomatic efforts to improve political and economic relations with the West resulted also in Polish efforts to improve the climate of relations with the United States. Working-level contacts improved, and by midyear Polish officials, projecting a new appearance of reasonableness and confidence, expressed belief that the time was ripe for a major improvement of relations with the United States. In May the regime responded to a similar US move 2 years earlier by partially lifting restrictions on the travel of US diplomatic personnel in Poland. These restrictions were imposed in 1964 in retaliation for restriction on Communist diplomatic movements in the United States instituted in late 1963. Some progress subsequently was achieved in settling or reaching tentative agreement on a number of political and economic issues which had long been irritants to mutual relations. The long-stalled negotiations for a consular agreement were reopened, and some specific questions in the area of Polish indebtedness were resolved. Some relative progress also was made in the area of cultural contacts, although cultural exchanges remained about 40% below the 1966 level. Hinting that the Polish decision to modernize its industry could involve significant purchases in the United States as well as other Western countries, Polish officials again privately urged the United States to ease its credit policy to help Poland finance the modernization of its obsolescent postwar, Soviet-equipped steel and petrochemical industries.
Not surprisingly, Gierek's first moves with regard to Polish-US relations centered on the economic sphere. Warsaw's interest in developing commercial and technical cooperation with the United States was emphasized by reports in early 1971 that the regime intended to appoint a leading economist, Witold Trampczynski - a veteran of both the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the State Planning Commission - as ambassador to Washington. (Because Trampczynski's expertise was needed in Warsaw, this appointment was not formally announced until October 1971.) Shortly thereafter, two high level
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7
