APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7
UN specialized agencies in which Poland does not have membership. Poland is a member of the UN Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission for Korea. It was also one of the three members - together with Canada and India - of the International Control Commission in Indochina, commonly known as the ICC. This body, after years of ineffectiveness and controversy, showed signs of passing out of existence with the conclusion of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement on 27 January 1973. At that time, Poland became one of the four members (together with Canada, Indonesia, and Hungary) of a new International Commission of Control and Supervision created to oversee the cease-fire.
In 1972 Poland's role in the United Nations was highlighted by the election of Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, Stanislaw Trepczynski, to the presidency of the regular fall session of the General Assembly. Trepczynski's competent and suave performance in this post was generally assessed as having enhanced Poland's image in the international organization. In addition, Poland in 1972 was a member (until 1974) of the Economic and Social Council, and a ranking Polish jurist (whose term expires in 1976) was one of the 15 members of the International Court of Justice. Even more clearly than elsewhere, Poland's policy in the United Nations has consistently followed that of the Soviet Union and its other Communist allies. In line with the general thrust of Poland's diplomacy over the years, it has played a major role in behalf of the Soviet bloc's disarmament and arms limitation proposals and in pressing such aspects of Soviet-sponsored measured toward detente as have been presented before the United Nations.
Poland has also sought expanded contacts with or formal membership in non-UN, Western, primarily economic organizations. On 18 October 1967 Warsaw succeeded in its long efforts to gain full membership in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), of which it had been an associate member since 1961. Like some other Eastern European Communist nations, Poland has dealt repeatedly although informally with offices of the European Community.
E. Threats to government stability (S)
1. Discontent and dissidence
Coming to power on the heels of a working class revolt against a regime theoretically representing the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the Polish leaders of the early 1970s are aware than any of their postwar predecessors of the limitations of their doctrine, and, above all, of the limits of popular tolerance toward a dictatorship indifferent to public opinion. This awareness probably is the Gierek regime's strongest asset; if the leadership maintains its apparently strong dedication to further reducing the gap between the rulers and the ruled, it could achieve a more broadly based stability while avoiding the pitfalls of its immediate predecessor.
Given the circumstances under which Gierek came to power, then the country was, in his own words, "on the brink of civil war," his policies appear to have achieved a remarkable degree of success. The emergency stopgap measures taken to deal with the immediate crisis proved effective. Subsequent moves toward overcoming the apathy and stagnation of the last years of the Gomulka era and in instilling a new sense of direction in the people.
Nevertheless, Gierek's credit with the population undoubtedly is not unlimited, and the ultimate stability of his regime depends on his maintaining momentum toward the implementation of an effective, long-range program of reform. Indeed, the main danger to stability is the possibility that sooner or later the regime may become less cohesive and more rigid in its thinking, and that material conditions will not continue steadily to improve. In this regard, Polish public opinion could be divided into three fluid and sometimes overlapping segments. The first and most prevalent view apparently is that Gierek will continue to take effective steps to deal with the country's long-range problems, and will ultimately succeed. A second segment, while also trusting the basic motives of the new leadership, feels that Gierek as unlikely to succeed in view of the magnitude of the difficulties that face Poland over the long term. Finally, a third segment simply appears to have no confidence in the new regime, believing that once it has fully consolidated its power it will revert, whether by design or unwillingly, to the inertia of the later Gomulka period. Notably younger people apparently display much more confidence in Gierek's prospects than older persons.
The divergent trends in public opinion contain elements that are at once conducive and inimical to change in Poland, and thus to the long-term stability of the regime. The existence of widespread confidence in the Gierek regime generated by expectations of real economic progress is a factor that not only induces the regime to maintain its momentum and to fulfill its pledges, but also contributes to increased productivity and efficiency at all levels - the keys to the success of the reforms. By contrast, however, the fact that popular expectations almost certainly exceed the
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7
