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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7


importantly, Gierek has succeeded in improving the political and social climate and in releasing long-repressed popular energies along constructive channels. Moreover, he has done this in ways that are conducive rather than inhibiting to his program of reform and to the prospects for stability.

The key to Gierek's long-term prospects evidently is his ability to achieve results in the economic area. Here, Gierek inherited an inert bureaucracy and a backwardness which made Poland lag even behind other Eastern European countries in introducing technological change and improvements in management and planning. Much has already been accomplished in terms of measurable consumer welfare, but institutional shifts have been negligible and there is no evidence that any major changes toward even a modified market economy are in the offing. Gierek's main intent seems to be a streamlining of the economic apparatus and an "energizing" of the workers and managers with only minimal changes in the basic centralized structure.

While gradually introducing various innovations, the new leadership has attempted to maintain a delicate balance between sometimes contradictory objectives - e.g. an improved "work ethic" within the framework of greater national discipline as against a freer internal atmosphere; the supremacy of the party as against a reformed and democratized governmental system; and greater initiative and responsibility by management as against worker participation in the decision-making process.

Even with the energetic measures that Gierek has taken, he has not eliminated all the well-entrenched domestic proponents of the old way of doing things. Moreover, he must be even more careful of offending similarly conservative elements among his allies, especially in Moscow. Nevertheless, given the embarrassing ideological circumstances of his coming to power - when the proletariat overthrew one Communist leadership and installed another - Gierek has been remarkably successful in obtaining an apparently full measure of Soviet support and confidence. Moreover, within the framework of his firm commitment to the Polish-Soviet alliance, he has apparently obtained approval for a much more energetic pursuit of Poland's self-interest on the international scene, particularly in seeking a more influential role in Europe. If Gierek can maintain the momentum of his reform progress and engage the full energy of the people, Poland's prospects in the 1970s may be brighter than most Poles believed possible at the beginning of that decade.


B. Structure and functioning of the government

The Polish governmental apparatus, divided into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, is an elaborate bureaucracy of state administration under a facade of parliamentary rule. It is, however, devoid of practical power, and is designed to implement policies set by the Communist party whose parallel apparatus controls that of the government on all levels. (U/OU)

Broad Communist party control over the entire hierarchy of government bureaucracy is exercised in several ways, and its extent - always pervasive - varies somewhat depending upon the issues and personalities involved. At the national level, the Politburo formulates policy with the First Secretary of the party making the final decisions; the party Secretariat, working with and through appropriate departments of the Central Committee, controls the execution of the policy by the corresponding levels of the government system. The same pattern of party control is repeated at lower levels of the party and government, with the result that it is the first secretary of the provincial party organization rather than the chairman of the local government body who has the real authority in each province. Effective party control has tended to be more uneven at the lowest levels, primarily because there have not been enough competent party functionaries to staff all the positions; however, even there the party rather than the local government apparatus tends to be the focus of power. (C)

There have been few structural changes in the institutions of government since party leader Edward Gierek came to power in December 1970. Gierek's major accomplishment in attempting to restore communication between the people and their rulers has been a change in the political and social climate, and a change in the style of rule exercised by the dominant Communist leadership. Nevertheless, despite the commitment of continuity of Communist institutions, the impact of the changes in Gierek's style has resulted in some important modifications in the practical as distinct from the theoretical relationship between the party and governmental structure, as well as in measures, some still tentative, to shift more of the policy-implementing responsibilities from the shoulders of the party onto those of the government. Without prejudicing the party's controlling role, its policymaking prerogatives, or its ultimate power to intervene at any stage, Gierek appears genuinely


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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2009/06/16: CIA-RDP01-00707R000200070029-7