Page:CMH Pub 9-2 - Stilwell's Command Problems.djvu/8

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Foreword

Although this is the second of a series covering the China-Burma-India Theater of Operations during World War II, it is a story in itself and one full of drama. The previous volume, Stilwell's Mission to China, recounts the early efforts of the United States to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army. This second volume presents the problems of a commander, his staff, and his troops in a position so irregular and complex as to be unprecedented in U.S. Army history, and outlines the background of their position in Allied policy, military and political. Their position was determined by an arrangement among allies, one accepted with reservations by the War Department. There is a saying: "There is but one thing more difficult than fighting a war with Allies—this is to fight a war without them."

A history of the Allied effort in China and Burma, to be complete, must be written in three dimensions, American-British-Chinese. The present volume is based on a thorough study of the American records and a wealth of information in General Stilwell's papers not previously explored. The full story of the war on the Asiatic mainland cannot be written until British studies are further advanced and the records and the views of the Chinese, of which only a superficial knowledge is now obtainable, have been disclosed and compared with those of their Western allies. Nevertheless, it seems desirable to tell the American story now. It is needed to round out the history of our Army's global effort and to do justice to the Americans, high and low, who made their contribution to victory in a vast and difficult but at the time little-known theater.


Washington, D. C.
30 January 1953

ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U.S.A.
Chief of Military History

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