tire day to advance across the gorge in his front; the movement toward his right was not accomplished until nearly dark, and sunset found the troops too much exhausted to render a night attack practicable. It was evident to all that we had not force enough to invest the enemy's position, or artillery enough to shell him out of it. ... I have never before encountered an enemy, civilized or savage, occupying a position of such great natural strength as the Modoc stronghold, nor have I ever seen troops engage a better armed or more skillful foe."
"It is utterly impossible to give a description of the place occupied by the enemy as their stronghold," says Green. " Everything was done by officers and men that could be done; troops never behaved better. They contended gallantly with an enemy hidden by rocks, deep gorges, and fog; we tried it on every side with the same result." "I will leave it to others," remarks Mason, "to find language to convey an adequate idea of the almost impassable character of the country over which these operations were conducted, and which make the Modoc position a second Gibraltar." And Bernard says, "I have wished, respectfully, to say that the place the Indians now occupy cannot be taken by a less force than seven hundred men; and to take the place by an assault by this force will cost half the command in killed and wounded. A large force, well supplied, judiciously handled, moving at night by approaches, piling up rocks to protect themselves so they can operate during the day, may take the place. Howitzers could be effectually used on the east side of the lava beds."
No blame could attach to any in consequence of defeat. The soldier should have anticipations of victory, and a general should believe in his own skill. There had been no drawbacks; the officers had gone into the fight fully prepared, even to the fog which was to conceal their advance; and though this circircumstance, or its constant continuance, was
