impartiality of his administration. At Naples Charles remained four months and a subsidy of a million ducats was voted to him, after a larger offer made in a vainglorious spirit had been wisely refused. That so large a sum could be raised proves the excellent results of Toledo's three years' rule. From Naples Charles proceeded to Rome, learning on his way that the French had attacked Savoy. He had already begun his preparations for defence in Navarre and Roussillon, and now sent urgent orders to assemble troops and collect money.
His presence in Italy, however, was worth an army to his cause. While still in Naples he had succeeded in securing Venice once more for the defensive league, and after his magnificent entry into Rome on April 5, 1536, he could hope that personal influence and concessions to the Pope's family ambitions would secure for him at least the neutrality of Rome. Eager, however, to vindicate his honour, he made before the Consistory and Ambassadors in solemn session a detailed exposition of his case against France and called upon the Pope to decide between them. Paul III declared his intention of remaining neutral, and, yielding at length to long-continued pressure, he issued on May 29 a Bull summoning a General Council to Mantua for May, 1537. The Pope had promised to do his best to reconcile the parties; but as France was determined to accept nothing less than Milan for the Duke of Orleans, and Charles could not, in view of the Dauphin's precarious life, accept his second brother, Henry, whose marriage alliance with the Medici family was another bar, the prospects of successful mediation were poor. But the position in Italy seemed fairly secure; and Henry of England, though an impossible ally for the Emperor, was too busy at home to cause much anxiety. The contest thus confined itself to France, and Charles, who had collected a great army of 50, 000 or 60, 000 men, was unwilling to consume it in the unpretending task of reconquering Savoy.
The invasion of Provence seemed likely to secure the evacuation of Savoy, besides the promise of further gain. Accordingly on July 25, 1536, the imperial army, taking advantage of the accession of the Marquis of Saluzzo to the Emperor's side, crossed the French border. But Montmorency, to whom Francis had entrusted the chief command, maintained the strictest defensive. His army was lodged in two fortified camps at Avignon and Valence; the country was systematically devastated; and Charles, though he was able to advance to Aix, found an attack on Marseilles or Aries impracticable. Nothing could be less French and nothing could be more effective than the strategy of Montmorency. On September 13 Charles was obliged to order the retreat.
Meanwhile in the north the Count of Nassau had conquered Guise and undertaken the siege of Peronne. But the war was unpopular in the Netherlands; subsidies were unwillingly granted and the money came in slowly; Peronne held out under the vigorous command of Fleuranges; and at the end of September Nassau also was forced to
