nso-i] Battle of Cowpens. March of Cornwallis. 227 Americans cannot be blamed for exacting the full penalty according to the rules of war. As a result of Ferguson's defeat, Cornwallis withdrew the main body of his force into South Carolina. A detachment of about 1500 men had been sent out from New York under General Leslie to join Cornwallis. Originally they were intended to advance by land through Virginia and join Cornwallis in North Carolina. Ferguson's defeat made this im- possible; and Leslie sailed to Charleston. Meanwhile Greene proceeded to take the offensive. He did not however feel himself strong enough for a general attack on Cornwallis. Accordingly he adopted the somewhat dangerous strategy of dividing his force and sending a strong detachment of about 600 men under Morgan to cut off supplies and interrupt communications, while his main body, of nearly 3000 men, moved cautiously through the upper country. To meet this Cornwallis detached a force under Tarleton to deal with Morgan, while he himself advanced, intending to intercept Morgan and then turn against Greene. , On January 17, 1781, Tarleton met Morgan at a place called the Cowpens, and sustained a crushing defeat. Nearly the whole of his force were taken prisoners; and the loss of the light troops crippled Cornwallis through the whole of his campaign. In spite of his victory, Morgan fully understood the danger of his position, and he at once turned to rejoin Greene. If Cornwallis had been able to carry out his original intention, Morgan would have found a British force across his line of march. Cornwallis however did not feel strong enough to advance till Leslie, who was on his way from Charleston, had joined him. This delay enabled Morgan to escape. His retreat was facilitated by local knowledge and by an opportune rain which rendered the fords behind him impassable. It is to be noticed that the delay which saved Morgan was due to the necessity of sending Leslie round by Charleston ; and that itself was a consequence of Ferguson's defeat. The main body of the American force also retreated. Thus the three forces were pressing northward in what one may call a broad-arrow formation, with Cornwallis in the middle. When he reached the banks of the Catawba, Cornwallis, feeling that all turned on the rapidity of his pursuit, destroyed the whole of his baggage and stores except what was absolutely necessary. In acting thus he was practically staking the whole result on the double chance of intercepting and defeating Morgan, and then annihilating Greene's force. If he could sweep that army out of existence it might be possible to advance into Virginia, living on the country and forming bases of supply as he went along. To do this with an army hanging on his flank would have involved a terrible risk; nor would the mere chance of cutting off Morgan's detachment without ulterior results have been worth the sacrifice. Yet it well may be that the calcula- tion was sound. For if Cornwallis failed to catch Morgan, he might CH. vii. 16 _ 2
