178?] Mode of election adopted. 291 the concurrence of the small States in the clause vesting the origination of money bills exclusively in the House of Representatives. Wilson pressed the objection that the whole plan now ran towards an aristocracy in the Senate. The Senate would have the appointment of the President (hi event of failure of the electors to make a choice), and through his dependence upon that body, the virtual appointment to offices, among others to the judiciary. The Senate was to make treaties, and to try impeachments. That, taken with what was now proposed, would combine the powers of the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary in one body. Gouverneur Morris contested this view; and Hamilton, though disliking the general scheme of government, liked much of the plan of the special committee. In the draft Constitution the President was a monster, elected for seven years and ineligible afterwards, having great powers of appointment to office, and constantly tempted, by being allowed but one term, to abuse his power in order to subvert the government. Eligibility to another term would not help matters, if the President was to be elected by the legislature ; he would still be tempted to use corrupt influence in order to secure continuance in office. Con- sidering the different feelings of different States, and the variety of districts, northern, middle, and southern, it would probably happen, as had been suggested, that the votes would be scattered, and that, ac- cording to the mode now favoured, the election would devolve upon the Senate. He too deprecated such a result, and suggested as a remedy that the highest number of votes, whether a majority or not, should elect. A small number might then, it was true, decide the question ; but as the plan now stood, the Senate might elect as President the candidate having the smallest number of votes. The whole clause of the special report, providing for election of President and Vice-president, for a term of four years, by electors etc., was now adopted, only two States voting against it. The House of Representatives, voting by States, was then substituted for the Senate as the body to elect in case of failure of the electors to do so; the Vice-president was to be ex ojficio President of the Senate; and with slight alteration the work was done, and became part of the Consti- tution, in Article II, section 1. The provision for removal of the President on impeachment and conviction passed the committee without debate. But in Convention objection was raised, and a motion was made by Charles Pinckney and Gouverneur Morris to strike out the clause. Pinckney was of opinion that the President ought not to be subject to impeachment while in office; Morris thought that it would be enough to punish his coad- jutors, and found practical difficulties in the method proposed by the resolution. Was impeachment to suspend his functions ? If not, the mischief would go on; if it was, the impeachment would be nearly CH. viii. 19 2
