1863 j Hooker's march on Richmond. 485 and to a most meritorious and honourable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain successes can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship." This missive, notifying him of his appointment, written confidentially to Hooker on January 25, 1863, did not become public for long years afterward. At its close it specially enjoined upon the new commander to " beware of rashness." The generous but searching criticism it con- tained doubtless made a deep impression upon Hooker, for he appears to have endeavoured seriously to conform to the President's injunctions. He laboured hard and succeeded well in restoring the morale of the troops, and by the middle of April had under his command about 130,000 soldiers on whose efficiency he felt he could firmly rely, while both the army and the country had acquired a strong faith in the new commander. In the interim he made several visits to Washington to confer with the President, and finally laid before him a plan of campaign which in his judgment promised success. Both armies remained in the same relative positions they had occupied while Burnside was in command, and Mr Lincoln impressed upon Hooker the obvious truth that his main objective should be, not Richmond, but the Confederate army; that it should not be attacked in its entrenchments, but by operations on its communications be drawn into an engagement outside of them. Having arranged his plan on this theory and received the Presi- dent's approval of the enterprise, Hooker began his movement on April 27 by strongly threatening Lee's right, a few miles below Fredericksburg, while he threw the bulk of his forces across the Rappahannock on boats and pontoon bridges twenty-seven miles above. On the 30th he had four army corps at Chancellorsville, eleven miles from Fredericksburg, ready to attack the enemy's rear. So far this movement had practically been a surprise to Lee. The plan had been conceived with skill, and up to this point executed with great energy and promptness ; and it seems conceded that, had the movement been pushed forward a short distance further, the Confederate army would have been obliged to fight a very disadvantageous battle. Hooker's qualities as a leader are tersely expressed by one of his critics in the phrase, "as an inferior he planned badly and fought well; as a chief he planned well and fought badly." Arrived at Chancellorsville, the energy of the commander and the momentum of the army suddenly slackened. The delay gave Lee time to bring up all his forces from Fredericksburg and entrench them in front of the Union advance, as well as to organise a flanking movement under Stonewall Jackson, which found its way round the unguarded Union CH. XV.
