Page:Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (redacted).djvu/7

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Cite as: 510 U. S. 569 (1994)
575

Opinion of the Court

From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright’s very purpose, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts … .” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.[1] For as Justice Story explained, “[i]n truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any, things, which in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.” Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (No. 4,436) (CCD Mass. 1845). Similarly, Lord Ellenborough expressed the inherent tension in the need simultaneously to protect copyrighted material and to allow others to build upon it when he wrote, “while I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science.”


    “(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending … .”

    A derivative work is defined as one “based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a ‘derivative work.’” 17 U. S. C. § 101.

    2 Live Crew concedes that it is not entitled to a compulsory license under § 115 because its arrangement changes “the basic melody or fundamental character” of the original. § 115(a)(2).

  1. The exclusion of facts and ideas from copyright protection serves that goal as well. See § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery …”); Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U. S. 340, 359 (1991) (“[F]acts contained in existing works may be freely copied”); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 547 (1985) (copyright owner’s rights exclude facts and ideas, and fair use).