national debt, which, as we have related, ended in a terrible explosion, and wide ruin to speculators. The result to the nation, instead of the discharge of the debt, was its augmentation by upwards of three millions. The South Sea Company still continued to hold a considerable portion of it in 1750. The interest, however, in 1727, was reduced to four and to three per cent. At this time the debt was resolved into the three per cent, reduced annuities and the three per cent. consolidated annuities, since better known by the abridged name of consols, now constituting the much larger part of the debt. The mode of forestalling the receipt of the taxes by the issue of exchequer bills, was introduced in 1696 by Charles Montague, afterwards earl of Halifax, then chancellor of the exchequer. These bills, now only issued at a hundred pounds each, were then, many of them, sold only for sums of five pounds and ten pounds.
Whilst parliament during this period was very liberal in granting the people's money, it was at the same time extremely tenacious of its own privileges. At no time has it appeared more so, or inclined to carry that privilege to such absurd lengths. Privilege of parliament is equivalent to prerogative of royalty, and evidently springs from the same source—the assertion of the superiority of the person or body in which it resides to the ordinary dominion of law. As kings formerly deemed themselves above and independent of parliaments, the grand source of law, and therefore arrogated to themselves peculiar rights and privileges called prerogatives, and not within reach of the ordinary courts of law, so parliament, when it came to exercise its legitimate influence, as one of the great organs of legislation, likewise asserted similar defensive and dignifying privileges. These privileges it was the more inclined to insist upon, because it came later into the exercise of them, and had to resist through them the power of the crown. But, like many new functions, there was a tendency to extend them beyond their proper bounds, and this was now particularly conspicuous. In the great conflict betwixt the crown and the parliament, which ended in the destruction of the monarchy, the whole of the privileges of parliament were fought out, but then the privileges of the body were considered rather than those of the individual members; now, those of the individual seemed to assume the most conspicuous form. Both the collective and the individual privilege had been asserted and defended, and the violators of either, though commissioned by the highest courts of law, punished. The collective privilege was held to cover everything concerning the honour and free functions of the houses of parliament. Not even a pardon under the great seal was to defeat any impeachment by the commons. Both houses claimed the right to punish political offences, and others which did not expressly concern themselves. Such were the cases of the Kentish Petition in 1701, and that of Ashby v. White in 1704; and in the following year, when the commons imprisoned five burgesses of Aylesbury for carrying the case of a contested election into a court of law, but, in the last instance, without establishing their authority. So also Floyd, for merely speaking disrespectfully of the elector-palatine and his wife in conversation, was severely punished by the lords in the reign of James I. But in the reign of George I. an equal stretch of parliamentary power was exercised by the commons, by committing Mist, the publisher of "Mist's Journal," for a libel which in no wise concerned them.
The power of punishing their own members, which has been established as a genuine privilege, and also that of determining everything relating to their own elections, was now settled. A great case, regarding jurisdiction over their own members, which became a precedent, was that of Mr. Arthur Hall, who, in 1580, published a book or pamphlet reflecting on some of the members, and which was also considered to be derogatory to the general power and dignity of the house of commons, for which he was expelled, fined, and imprisoned. But in queen Anne's time, the commons grossly exceeded their jurisdiction by expelling Sir Richard Steele for publishing a pamphlet called the "Crisis," which did not reflect at all on the house, but only on the ministry. In some other cases parliament endeavoured to stretch its power to still more preposterous lengths, by declaring parties incapable of sitting in parliament for such extraneous offences.
The intention of individual privileges of members was to protect them from arrest on civil actions during the sittings of parliament, and to give them exemption from prosecution for the freedom of speech and in debate within their respective houses. But this was soon extended not only to members at all times, but as the king claimed privilege for his servants, parliament claimed the like for the servants, and even tenants, of members; nay, they extended the same privilege to the property of members. At various times during the reign of George II. it was voted a breach of parliamentary privilege to trespass on the lands of members, to interfere with their footmen, to have killed some of lord Galway's rabbits, caught some of Jolliffe’s fish, cut down some of Mr. Hungerford's trees, dug some of the coals of Mr. Ward, and the lead of Sir Robert Grosvenor. It was held that even an execution could not be levied on a member's goods for debt. The act of 12 William III., c. 3, restrained the privilege of members from arrest to the time of the actual session of parliament, but all these other overstrained personal exemptions remained till the 10th of George III.
There were various attempts during this period to limit; the powers of the crown, some of which were easily over-ridden by the standing, and often well-paid, majorities of ministers. In the reign of queen Anne, a new act of settlement was made conferring the succession, in default of issue by the queen, on the electress Sophia of Hanover and her posterity. In this act, taught by the evils which had arisen in Dutch William's reign from these causes, it was provided, that whoever wore the crown should not be at liberty to leave the country without consent of parliament, and, moreover, that this country should not be obliged to go to war to defend any other country which the king or queen might possess. But the clause respecting the king going abroad, was immediately repealed on the accession of George I., and though the country was not actually obliged to go to war to defend Hanover, the obsequious parliament rushed into the most ruinous wars on that account.
By this act of settlement it was also sought to limit the power of the crown by making all paid servants of the crown, from the highest minister to the lowest deputy.
