ORIGEN
310
ORIGEN
dangerous groun<l. Tlio system may be reduccil to a
few liypotheses, the error luid danger of which were
not roeognized by Origen.
(1) Khrnily of the Cnalion — Whatever exists out- side of God was created by Him: the Alexandrian catcchist always defended this thesis most energeti- cally against the pagan philosophers who admitted an uncrcateii matter (" Deprincip.", II, i, 5; " In Genes.", I, 12, in Migne, XII, 48-49). But he believes that God created from eternity, for "it is absurd ", he says, "to imagine the nature of God inactive, or His good- ness inefficacious, or His dominion without subjects" (De princip.. Ill, v, 3). Consequently he is forced to admit a double infinite series of worlds before and after the present world. (2) Original Equality of the Created Spirits. — In the beginning all intellectual na- tures were created equal and alike, as Go<l had no mo- tive for creating thi'in otherwise" (De princip., II, ix, 6). Their present <lilferences arise solely from their different use of the gift of free will. The spirits cre- ated good and happy grew tired of their happiness (op. cit., I, iii, S), and, through carelessness, fell, some more some less (I, vi, 2). Hence the hierarchy of the angels; hence also the four categories of created intel- lects: angels, stars (supposing, as is probable, that they are animated, "De princip.", I, vii, 3), men, and demons. But their roles may be one day changed; for what free will has done, free will can undo, and the Trinity alone is essentially immutable in good.
(3) Essence and raison d'etre of Matter. — Matter ex- ists only for the spiritual; if the spiritual did not need it, matter would not exist, for its finality is not in itself. But it seems to Origen — though he does not venture to declare so expressly — that created spirits even the most perfect cannot do without an extremely diluted and subtle matter which serves them as a vehicle and means of action (De princip., II, ii, 1; I, vi, 4 etc.). Matter was, therefore, created simulta- neously with the spiritual, although the spiritual is log- ically prior; and matter will never cease to be because the spiritual, however perfect, will always need it. But matter which is susceptible of indefinite transfor- mations is adapted to the varying condition of the spirits. "When intended for the more imperfect spirits, it becomes solidified, thickens, and forms the bodies of this visible world. If it is serving higher in- telligences, it shines with the brightness of the celes- tial bodies and serves as a garb for the angels of God, and the children of the Resurrection" (op. cit., II, ii, 2).
(4) Universality of the Redemption and the Final Res- toration. — Certain Scriptural texts, e. g., I Cor., xv, 25-28, seem to extend to all rational beings the benefit of the Redemption, and Origen allows himself to be led also by the philosophical principle which he enunci- ates several times, without ever proving it, that the end is always like the beginning: "We think that the goodness of God, through the mediation of Christ, will bring all creatures to one and the same end" (De princip., I, vi, 1-3). The universal restoration (dirofcariffTaffi!) follows necessarily from these prin- ciples.
On the least reflection, it will be seen that these hypotheses, starting from contrary points of view, are irreconcilable: for the theory of a final restoration is diametrically opposed to the theory of successive in- definite trials. It would be easy to find in the writ- ings of Origen a mass of texts contradicting these prin- ciples and de.^^roying the resulting conclusions. He affirms, for instance, that the charity of the elect in heaven does not fail; in their case "the freedom of the will will be bound so that sin %vill be impossible" (In Roman., V, 10). So, too, the reprobate will always be fixed in evil.lessfrom in.ability to free themselves from it. than because they wish to be evil (De princip., I, viii,4), for malice has become natural to them, it is as a second nature in them (In Joann., xx, 19). Origen grew
angry when accused of teaching the eternal salvation
of the devil. But the hypotheses which he lays down
here and there are none the less worthy of censure.
What can be said in his defence, if it be not with St.
Athanasius (De decretis Nic, 27), that we must not
.seek to find his real o])inion in the works in which he
(liscu.sses the arguments for and against ductrine as an
intellectual exercise or amusement; or, with St. Jerome
(.\d Pammach. Epist., XLVIII, 12), that it is one
thing to dogmatize and another to enunciate hypo-
thetical opinions which will be cleared up by discus-
sion?
III. Orioenist Controversies. — The discussions concerning Origen and his teaching are of a very sin- gular and very complex character. They break out unexpectedly, at long intervals, and assume an im- mense importance quite unforeseen in their humble beginnings. They are complicated by so many per- sonal disputes and so many questions foreign to the fundamental subject in controversy that a brief and rapid expose of the polemics is difficult and well-nigh impossible. Finally they abate so suddenly that one is forced to conclude that the controversy was super- ficial and that Origen's orthodoxy was not the sole point in dispute.
A. — First Origenist Crisis. — It broke out in the deserts of Egypt, raged in Palestine, and ended at Constantinople with the condemnation of St. Chrys- ostom (392-404). During the second half of the fourth century the monks of Nitria professed an ex- aggerated enthusiasm for Origen, whilst the neighbour- ing brethren of Sceta, as a result of an unwarranted reaction and an excessive fear of allegorism, fell into Anthropomorphism. These doctrinal discussions gradually invaded the monasteries of Palestine, which were under the care of St . Eiiii)lKiniiis. Bishop of Sala- mis, who, convinced of the dangers of Origenism, had combatted it in his works and was determined to pre- vent its spread and to extirpate it completely. Hav- ing gone to Jerusalem in 394, he preached vehemently against Origen's errors, in presence of the bishop of that city, John, who was deemed an Origenist. John in turn spoke against Anthropomorphism, directing his discourse so clearly against Epiphanius that no one could be mistaken. Another incident soon helped to embitter the dispute. Epiphanius had raised Paul- inian, brother of St. Jerome, to the priesthood in a place subject to the See of Jerusalem. John com- plained bitterly of this]violation of his rights, and the reply of Epiphanius was not of a nature to appease him.
Two new combatants now enter the lists. From the time when Jerome and Rufinus settled, one at Bethle- hem and the other on Mt. Olivet, they had lived in brotherly friendship. Both admired, imitated, and translated Origen, and were on most amicable terms with their bishop, when in 392 Aterbius, a monk of Sceta, came to Jerusalem and accused them both of Origenism. St. Jerome, very sensitive on<t.he question of orthodoxy, was much hurt by the insinuation of Aterbius and two years later sided with St. Epipha- nius, whose reply to John of Jerusalem he translated into Latin. Rufinus learnt, it is not known how, of this translation, which was not intended for the pub- lic, and Jerome suspected him of having obtained it by fraud. A reconciliation was effected sometime later, but it was not lasting. In 397 Rufinus, then at Rome, had translated Origen's "De principiis" into Latin, and in his preface followed the example of St. Jerome, whose dithyrambic eulogy addressed to the Alexan- drian catechist he remembered. The solitary of Beth- lehem, grievously hurt at this action, wrote to his friends to refute the perfidious implications of Ru- finus. denounced Origen's errors to Pope Anastasius, tried to win the Patriarch of Alexandria over to the anti-Origenist cause, and began a discussion with Rufinus, marked with great bitterness on both sides.
