PRAGMATISM
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PRAGMATISM
movement. Nevertheless, it is clear that Kant, who is
held responsible for so many of the recent develop-
ments in philosophy and theology, has had a deciding
influence on the origin of Pragmatism. Descartes, by
reason of the emphasis he laid on the theoretical con-
sciousness, "I think, therefore I exist", may be said to
be the father of Intellectualism. From Kant's substi-
tution of moral for theoretical consciousness, from his
insistence on "I ought" instead of "I think", came a
whole progeny of Voluntaristic or non-rational philos-
ophies, especially Lotze's philosophy of "value instead
of validity", which were not without influence on the
founders of Pragmatism. Besides the influence of
Kant, there is also to be reckoned the trend of scien-
tific thought during the hist half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. In ancient and medieval times the scientist
aimed at the discovery of causes and the establishment
of laws. The cause was a fact of experience, ascertain-
able by empirical methods, and the law was a general-
ization from facts, representing the real course of
events in nature. With the advent of the evolution
theory it was found that an unproved hypothesis or
hjTJOthetical cause, if it cx-plains the facts observed,
fulfils "the same purpose and ser\'es the same ends as a
true cause or an established law. Indeed, if evolution,
as a hj-pothosis, explains the facts observed in plant
and animal life, or if a hj-pothetical medium, like ether,
explains the facts obser\-ed in regard to light and heat,
there is no reason, say the scientists, why we should
concern ourselves further about the truth of evolution
or the existence of ether. The hj'pothesis functions
satisfactorily, and that is enough. From this equaliza-
tion of hj-pothesis with law and of provisional explana-
tion n-ith proved fact arose the tendency to equalize
postulates with axioms, and to regard as true anj' prin-
ciple which works out well, or functions satisfactorily.
Moreover, evolution had familiarized scientists with
the notion that all progress is conditioned by adjust-
ment to new conditions. It was natural, therefore, to
consider that a problem presented to the thinking mind
calls for the adjustment of the previous content of the
mind to the new experience in the problem pondered.
A principle or postulate or attitude of mind that would
bring about an adjustment would satisfy the mind for
the time being, and would, therefore, solve the prob-
lem. This satisfaction came, consequently, to be con-
sidered a test of truth. This account, however, would
be incomplete without a mention of the temperamen-
tal, racial, and, in a sense, the environmental deter-
minants of Pragmatism. The men who represent
Pragmatism are of the motor-active tj^je; the coun-
try, namely the United States, in which Pragmatism
has flourished most is pre-eminently a countrj- of
achie\'ement, and the age in which Pragmatism has
appeared is one which bestows its highest praise on
successful endeavour. The first of the Pragmatists
declares that Pragmatism rests on the axiom "The end
of man is action", an axiom, he adds, which does not
recommend itself to him at sixty as forcibly as it did
when he w;is thirty.
II. The Pr.\gm.\tists. — In a paper contributed to the "Popular Science Monthly" in 1S78 entitled "How to make our Ideas clear", Mr. C. S. Peirce first used the word Pragmatism to designate a principle put forward by him as a rule to guide the scientist and the mathematician. The principle is that the meaning of any conception in the mind is the practical effect it will have in action. "Consider what effects which might conceivably have practical bearings we consider the object of our conception to have. Then our con- ception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." This rule remained unnoticed for twenty years, until it was taken up by Professor Wil- liam James in his address delivered at the University of California in 189S. "Pragmatism", according to James, "is a temper of mind, an attitude; it is also a theory of the nature of ideas and truth; and finally, it
is a theory about reality" (Journal of Phil., V, 85).
As he uses the word, therefore, it designates (a) an
attitude of mind towards philosophy, (b) an cpiste-
mology, and (c) a metaphysics. James's epistemology
and metaphysics will be described in sections III and
I\'. The attitude which he calls Pragmatism he de-
fines as follows: "The whole function of philosophy
ought to be to find out what definite difference it will
make to you and me, at definite instants of our lives,
if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true
one" (Pragmatism, p. 50). Thus, when one is con-
fronted with the evidence in favour of the formula
"the hiunan soul is immortal", and then turns to the
considerations put forward by the sceptic in favour of
the formula "the human soul is not immortal", what
is he to do? If he is a Pragmatist, he will not be con-
tent to weigh the evidence, to compare the case for
with the case against immortality; he will not attempt
to fit the affirmative or the negative into a "closed
system" of thought; he will work out the conse-
quences, the definite differences, that follow from each
alternative, and decide in that way which of the two
"works" better. The alternative which works better
is true. The attitude of the Pragmatist is "the atti-
tude of looking away from first things, principles,
categories, supposed necessities; and of looking
towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts" (op.
cit., .55).
This view of the scope and attitude of philosophy is sustained in Professor James's numerous contributions to the literature of Pragmatism (see bibUography), in lectures, articles, and re\'iews which obtained for him the distinction of being the most thorough-going and the most eminent, if not the most logical, of the Prag- matists. Next in importance to James is Professor John Dewey, who in his "Studies in Logical Theory" and in a number of articles and lectures, defends the doctrine known variously as Instrumentalism, or Im- mediate Empiricism. According to Dewey, we are constantly acquiring new items of knowledge which are at first unrelated to the pre\'ious contents of the mind; or, in moments of reflection, we discover that there is some contradiction among the items of knowl- edge already acquired. This condition causes a strain or tension, the removal of which gives satisfaction to the thinker. An idea is "a plan of action", which we use to reUeve the strain; if it performs that function successfully, that is, satisfactorily, it is true. The adjustment is not, however, one-sided. Both the old truths in the mind and the new truth that has just entered the mind must be modified before we can have satisfaction. Thus there is no static truth, much less absolute truth; there are truths, and these are con- stantly being made true. This is the view which, under the names Personalism, and Humanism, has been emphasized by Professor F. S. Schiller, the fore- most of the English exponents of Pragmatism. "Hu- manism", and "Studies in Humanism" are the titles of his principal works. Pragmatism, Schiller thinks, "is in reality only the application of Humanism to the theory of knowledg:e" (Humanisni, p. xxi), and Humanism is the doctrine that there is no absolute truth, but only truths, which are constantly being made true by the mind working on the data of expe- rience.
On the Continent of Europe, Pragmatism has not attained the same prominence as in English-speaking coimtries. Nevertheless, writers who favour Prag- matism see in the teachings of Mach, Ostwald, Avena- rius, and Simmel a tendency towards the Pragmatic definition of philosophy. James, for instance, quotes Ostwald, the illustrious Leipzig chemist, assaying, "I am accustomed to put questions to my classes in this way: in what respects would the world be different if this alternative or that were true? If I can find nothing that would becomedifTerent, then the alternative has no sense" (Pragmatism, p. 48). Avenarius's "Criticism
