TYRE
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TYRE
category' of those to whom authority is given to kill
the tyrant (Crolly, loc. cit.).
If an usurper has already established his rule and peacefully reigns, until the prescriptive period has run its course the legitimate ruler can lawfully expel him by force if he is able to do so, and can punish him with death for his offence. If, however, it is out of the legitimate ruler's power to re-establish his own authority, there is nothing for it but to acquiesce in the actual state of affairs and to refrain from merging the community in the miseries of useless warfare. In these circumstances, subjects are bound to obey the just laws of the realm, and can lawfully take an oath of obedience to the de facto ruler, if the oath is not of such a nature as to acknowledge the legitimac}' of the usurper's authority (cf. Brief of Pius \'lll, 29 Sept., 1S30). This teaching is altogether different from the view of those who put forward the doctrine of accomplished facts, as it has come to be called, and who maintain that the actual peaceful possessor of the ruling authority is also legitimate ruler. This is nothing more or less than the glorification of success- ful robbery.
II. Tyrant by Oppression. — Looking on a tyrant by oppression as a public enemy, many authorities claimed for his subjects the right of putting him to death in defence of the common good. Amongst these were John of Sahsbury in the twelfth century (Polycraticus, III, 1.5; IV, "l; VIII, 17), and John Parvus (Jehan Petit) in the fifteenth century. The Council of Constance (1415) condemned as contrary to faith and morals the following proposition: "Any vassal or subject can lawfully and meritoriously kill, and ought to kill, any tyrant. He may even, for this purpose, avail himself of ambushes, and wily expres- sions of affection or of adulation, notwithstanding any oath or pact imposed upon him by the tyrant, and without waiting for the sentence or order of any judge" (Sess. XV). Subsequently a few Catholics defended, with many limitations and safeguards, the right of subjects to kill a tyrannical ruler. Fore- most amongst these was the Spanish .lesuit Mariana. In his book, " De rege et regis institutione" (Toledo, 1.599), he held that people ought to bear with a tyrant as long as possible, and to take action only when his oppression surpassed all bounds. They ought to come together and give him a warning; this being of no avail they ought to declare him a public enemy and put him to death. If no public judgment could be given, and if the people were unanimous, any sub- ject might, if po.ssible, kill him by open, but not by secret means. The book was dedicated to Philip III of Spain and was written at the request of his tutor Garcias de Loaysa, who afterwards became Bishop of Toledo. It was published at Toledo in the printing-office of Pedro Rodrigo, printer to the king, with the approbation of Pedro de Ona, Provincial of the Mercedarians of Madrid, antl with the permission of Stephen Ilojeda, visitor of the Society of Jesus in the Province of Toledo (see M.\ri.\n.4, Jdan). Most unfairly the Jesuit Order has been blamed for the teaching of Mariana. As a matter of fact, Mariana stated that his teaching on tyrannicide was his personal opinion, and immediately on the publi- cation of the book the Jesuit General Aquaviva ordered that it be corrected. He also on 6 July, 1610, forbade any member of the order to teach publicly or privately that it is lawful to attempt the life of a tyrant.
Though Catholic doctrine condemns t>Tannicide as opposed to the natural law, formerly great theo- logians of the Church like St. Thomas fll-II, Q. xlii, a. 2), Suarez (Def. fidei, VI, iv, 15), and Bafiez, O.P. (De justitia et jure, Q. Ixiv, a. .3), permitted rebellion again.st oppressive rulers when the t\Tanny had become extreme and when no other means of safety were available. This merely carried to
its logical conclusion the doctrine of the Middle
Ages that the supreme ruling authority comes from
God through the people for the pubhc good. As the
people immediately give sovereignty to the ruler, so
the people can deprive him of his sovereignty when he
has used his power oppressively. Many authorities,
c. g. Suarez (Def. fidei, VI, iv, IS), held that the
State, but not private persons, could, if necessary,
condemn the tyrant to death. In recent times
Catholic authors, for the most part, deny that sub-
jects have the right to rebel against and depose an
unjust ruler, except in the case when the ruler was
ajjpointed under the condition that he would lose his
power if he abused it. In proof of this teaching they
appeal to the Syllabus of Pius IX, in which this
l)roposition is condemned: "It is lawful to refu.se
obedience to legitimate princes, and even to rebel"
(prop. Ixiii). While denying the right of rebellion
in the strict sense whose direct object is the deposi-
tion of the tyrannical ruler, many Catholic writers,
such as Crolly, Cathrein, de Bie, Zigliara, admit the
right of subjects not only to adopt an attitude of
passive resistance against unjust laws, but also in
extreme cases to assume a state of active defensive
resistance against the actual aggression of a legitimate,
but oppressive ruler. Many of the Reformers were
more or less in favour of tyrannicide. Luther held
that the whole community could condemn the tyrant
to death ("Siimmtliche Werke", LXII, p'rankfort-
on-the-Main and Erlangen, 18.54, 201, 206). Me-
lanchthon said that the killmg of a tyrant is the most
agreeable offering that man can make to God (Corp.
Ref., Ill, Halle, 1836, 1076). The Calvinist writer
styled Junius Brutus held that individual subjects
have no right to kill a legitimate tyrant, but that
resistance must be authorized by a representative
council of the people (Vindicia? contra Tyrannos, p.
45). John Knox affirmed that it was the duty of
the nobiUty, judges, rulers, and people of England to
condemn Queen I^Iary to death (Appellation).
RiCKABY, Moral Philosophy (London, 1909) ; Balmez, Prol- estantism and Catholiritu Compared (London, 1849); Crolly, Dc justitia et jure. III (Duhliii. 1877); Zioliara, Philosophia moralin (Paris, lOini; CvTmnix. Philosophia moralis {YTe\huTfi im Br., 1911); HE 111. . /V,i/,. ,,,,/,,„ moralis (Louvain, 1910); Ver- MEER8CH. Df >usfl(M I I'.nii;( -. I'.i04); Waffelaert, Cc yusfi/iVi (Bniges, 1886); SuABti, U.j.nsm fidei (Paris, 1859); Heiner, Der Syllabus (Mainz. 1905); The Month (March- April, 1873); Lecky, The Rise and Influence of RatioTialism in Europe (Lon- don, 1910).
J. M. Harty.
Tyre (Tyrus), Melchite archdiocese and Maronite diocese. The city is called in Hebrew, Znr, and in Arabic, Sour, from two words meaning rock. It is very ancient. If we are to believe [jriests of MeUcart quoted by Herodotus (II, 44) it was founded in the twenty-eighth century B. c. Isaias himself (xxiii, 7) says that its origin was ancient. According to the authors cited by Josephus (.4nt. jud., VIII, iii, 1) and according to Justin (Hist., x-\'iii, 3) its foundation dates from the thirteenth centurj' n. c, but this is manifestly erroneous, for Tyre is mentioned under the name of Sour-ri in the tablets of El-Amarna, between 13S5 and 1.368 b. c. (Revue Bibhque, 1908, 511). King Abimelech was then reigning there independently, though his capital was much coveted by the Eg>'p- tians, who forced the Tyriansto .illy themselves with their neighbours, especially the Philistines (see Ecclus., xlvi, 21). Ancient writers, particularly Isaias (xxiii, 12), call TjTe "daughter of Sidon"," that is, they make it a colony of the latter city. Despite ob- jections which have been made to this, the state- ment is correct, and on its coins Sidon claims to be the mother of Hippo Regius, in Africa, of Tyre etc. It is true that in a short time the colony over- sh.adowed the mother, but the inhabitants con- tinued to call themselves Sidonians. On the other hand, it is impo.s.sible to .state which of the two cities, Palaetyrus, on the sea-coast, or Tyrus, built on a
