WAR
549
WAR
in itself or in its ordinary natural consequences would
be morally as great a detriment to the common good
of the state aggrieved as the damages which war con- ducted against the aggressor would entail upon the common good of the same, throwing into the balance igainst the latter the additional amount of damage Jue him as the punishment of retributive justice. Finally, a state going to war must weigh its own prob- ible losses in blood and treasure, and its prospect of I'ictory, before it may rightly enter upon a war: for the interests of the common good at home inhibit the exercise of force abroad, unless reasonably calcu- lated not to be an ultimate graver loss to one's own
- ommunity. This is not properly a hmitation of
title, but a prudential limitation upon the exercise of i right in the face of full title. The proper jiurpose of ivar is indicated by the title, and war conducted for I purpose beyond that contained in a just title is a moral wrong.
V. The Subject-maiter of the Eight op War. — rhis v.-ill cover what may be done Dy the warring sower in exercise of its right. It embraces the inflic-
- ion of aU manner of damage to property and life of
- he other state and its contending subjects, up to the
neasure requisite to enforce submission, implying the icceptance of a final readjustment and proportionate jenalty; it includes in general all acts that are neces- sary means to such damage, but is checked by the proviso that neither the damage inflicted nor the neans taken involve actions that are intrinsically mmoral. In the prosecution of the war the killing 3r injuring of non-combatants (women, children, the iged and feeble, or even those capable of bearing arms 3ut as a matter of fact not in any way participating n the war) is consequently barred, except where their simultaneous destruction is an unavoidable accident ittending the attack upon the contending force. The ivanton destruction of the property of such non-com- oatants, where it does not or will not minister main-
- enance or help to the state or its army, is hkewise
devoid of the requisite condition of necessity. In fact
- he wanton destruction of the property of the state
3r of combatants — i. e. where such destruction cannot iiake for their submission, reparation, or proportion- ite punishment — is beyond the pale of the just sub- ject-matter of war. The burning of the Capitol and ^Vhite House at Washington in 1S14, and the devasta- tion of Georgia, South Carolina, and the Valley of the Shenandoah during the American Civil War have not Bscaped criticism in this category. That "war is bell", in the sense that it inevitably carries with it a maximum of human miseries, is true; in the .sense that it justifies anything that makes for the suffering and punishment of a people at war, it cannot be ethically maintained. The defence, that it hastens the close a( war through sympathy with the increased suff<>ring even of non-combatants, will not stand. The kilhng of the wounded or prisoners, who thereby have ceased to be combatants, and have rendered submission, is not only no necessity, but beyond the limits of right because of submission, while common charity requires that they be properly cared for.
A doubt might arise about the obligation to spare wounded and prisoners, the guardianship or care of whom would prevent immediate further prosecution of the war at perhaps its most auspicious moment, or their di.smis.sal but replenish the forces of the enemy. The care of the wounded might be waived, as its obhgation is not of justice but of charity, which yields to a superior claim of one's own benefit: but the killing of prisoners presents a different problem. All practical doubt in the matter has been removed among civilized nations by the agreements of inter- national law. The canons of the natural law of necessity and proportion this side the limit of intrinsic moral wrong are so h.ard of application by the con- tending forces that the history of wars is full of
excesses; hence international law has steadily moved
towards hard and fast lines that will lessen the waste
of human life and the miseries of warfare. Thus the
use of ammunition causing excessive destruction of
human life or excessive suffering, inciu'able wounds, or
human defacement beyond the requirements for
putting the combatants out of the conflict and so
winning a battle are excluded by international agree-
ment based upon the obvious hmitation of the natural
law. Poisoning, as imperilhng the innocent beyond
measure, and a.ssassination, as associated with treach-
ery and the personal assumption of the right of life
and death (to say nothing of its want of a fair oppor-
tunity of defence and the cowardice commonly im-
plied therein), have met with common condemnation,
thus closing the loophole of obscurity in the natural
law. The natural law is clear enough, however, in
condemning as intrinsically immoral lying and the
direct deception of another, as well as bad faith and
treachery. The phrase, "All is fair in love and war",
cannot be taken seriously; it is a loose by-word taken
from the reckless practices of men, and runs counter
to right reason, natural law, and justice. No end
justifies an immoral means, and lying, perjury, bad
faith, treachery, as well as the direct slaughter of the
innocent, wanton destruction, and the lawless pillage
and outrage of cruder times, are, as far as the worst of
them go, a thing of the past among civihzed nations.
That states are not always nice in conscience about
lying, deceit, and bad faith in war as in diplomacy is
occasionally a fact to-day; and the defence of lying
and deceit in the stratagems of war, where good faith
or common convention is not violated, is a sequence
of the erroneous doctrine of Grote that lying is not
intrinsically immoral, but only wrong in as far as those
with whom we deal have a right to demand the truth
of us; but as such teaching is almost unanimously
repudiated in Catholic philosophy, the practice has
to-day in Catholic thought no ethical advocate. The
hanging of spies, though commonly said to be merely
a measure of menace against a peculiar peril of war,
would seem to have behind it a remote suggestion of
punishment of a form of deceit which is intrinsically
v\Tong.
In the terms of readjustment after victory, the vic- torious state, if its cause was just, may exact full reparation of the original injustice suffered, full compensation for all its own losses by reason of the war, proportionate penalty to secure the future not only against the conquered state, but, through fear of such penalty, even against other possibly hostile states. In the execution of such judgment the killing of surviving contestants or their enslavement, though, absolutely speaking, these might fall within the meas- ure of just punishment, would to-day seem to be an extreme penalty, and the practice of civilization has abohshed it. Here we are confronted with the appal- ling destruction of the vanquished in the Old-Testa- ment wars, where frequently all the adult males were slain after defeat and surrender, and sometimes even the women and children, unto utter extermination. But we cannot argue natural right from these in- stances, for, where justly done, this wholesale slaugh- ter was the direct command of God, the Sovereign Arbiter of life and death, as well as the Just Judge of all reward and puni.shment. God by revelation made the Israelites but executioners of His supernatural sentence: the penalty was within God's right to assign, and within the I.sraelites' communicated right to enforce. The natural law gives man the right to no such measure. 1'he a7)propriation of a part of the territory of the vanquished may quite readily be a neces.sity of payment for reparation of injurj- and loss, and even the entire subjection of the conquered state, as a part of, or tribut.arj' to, its conqueror, may po.'s.si- bly fall within the proportionate requirements for full reparation or for future security, and, if so, such sub-
