BIBLICAL
554
BIBLICAL
of the Hebrew commvmity was in Yahweh, Moses,
strictly speaking, was but the viceroy of Yahweh;
and the same, to a certain extent, may also be said
of Joshua. Their successors, the judges, were rather
military commanders than judges or magistrates
in the strict sense. With the beginning of the mon-
archy, the civil as well as the military power began
to be concentrated, as far as possible, in the person
of the king. But the Pentateuchal legislation as a
whole is decidedly adverse to the idea of concentrat-
ing all power in the person of the king, or in that of
any individual, and it is not improbable that the
writer of Deut., xvii, was influenced by Israel's
historical experience under the monarchy.
Allusions to the administration of law and justice in the old Book of the Covenant are extremely meagre and utterly fail to give us any clear (or even vague) reference to legal procedure, judges, courts, or to any system of administration of justice. It is true that the Book of the Covenant contains statutes and judgments, apparently enacted by some au- tlioritative power; for such an authority must be assumed, otherwise there would be no meaning in the precise fixing of punishment, etc., such as the punishment of death, seven times prescribed, and the avenging on the body of the guilty person the wrong he had done. Still, as Kautzsch rightly re- marks, "we are wholly in the dark as to the circle from which all the statutes and judgments proceeded, and, above all, as to the public authority by which scrupulous obedience was ensiu'ed. And, emphat- ically as justice and impartiality in legal eases is insisted on (x.xiii, IT.), there is not a single indication as to who is authorized to pronounce sentence or to supervise the execution of the verdict." In two cases, however, viz., in Exodus, xxi, 6 and xxii, 8, in which the case is complicated and the law doubtful, the Book of the Covenant insists that the parties should present themselves "before God" (Elohim): in the first case probably to perform a symbolic act which will have legal effect, and in the second probably to obtain an oracle. The Septuagint seems to have understood the sense of the phrase before God in its most obvious meaning, rendering it "before the tribunal of God", i. e. that the matter is to be referred to the judgment of God, presumably in the sanctuary or before the priest. Rabbinical tradition, however, as early as the time of St. Jerome, took the word Elohim (God) as a plural, i. e. "gods", arguing that the word here means simply "judges", from the fact that, on accoimt of the sacredness of their office, and the place where their decisions were rendered (often in the temple or at some sacred shrine) the judges were called "gods". The rab- binical interpretation which has been followed by the majority of ancient and modern commentators, ingenious though it be, is nevertheless erroneous; for, considering the fact that the two cases referred to were such as no judge could decide with any cer- tainty or probability, and in which only a divine intervention could bring about a satisfactory so- lution, we may assume that the rabbinical inter- pretation is untenable. This conclusion has been admirably vindicated by the Code of Hammurabi, where, in several cases in which the doubt is such as to make any human wisdom of no avail, and any judicial decision untrustworthy, the decision is left to God Himself. Hence, in all such cases Hammurabi decrees that the litigants should present themselves "before God", and swear by His name, i. e. take an oath. The expression used by Hammurabi is exactly the same as that used in the two passages of E.xodus referred to, and the cases in which tJhe expression is applied are analogous. But in the Code of Ham- murabi "to appear before God" is the same as "to swear by the name of Ciod", or "to take a solemn oath"; hence, in the two passages of Exodus, to
appear before Elohim does not mean to appear before
the judges, but to take a solemn oath at some holy
place or sanctuary where the presence of the deity
was more sensibly felt. By taking an oath the man
in question constitutes God as the judge before
whom he protests his innocence and affirms his
rights. GoQ is thereby called upon to avenge Him-
self upon the perjurers. And this God is neither
Bel, nor Marduk, nor any other particular god, but
is the Deity in its almost abstract form — He who is
considered to be everywhere and to know every-
thing. Hence the rabbinical interpretation, fol-
lowed, till the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi,
by the majority of commentators, may be confidently
dismissed.
The legislation of Deuteronomy, on the other hand, which is in the main considerably later than that of the Book of the Covenant, furnishes us with more abundant details concerning the administra- tion of law and justice in Israel. These are con- tained mainly in xvi, 18-20; xvii, 8-13, and 14-20; xix, 15-20, and xxv, 1-4. From II Chronicles (D. V. Paralipomenon) we learn that King Jehoshaphat established in Jerusalem a supreme tribunal, or court of justice, where priests and lay judges par- ticipated in the administration of justice each in their own sphere, and that he appointed judges in all cities of Judah. Details are lacking, but in its broader features the judicature thus established by Jehoshaphat agrees remarkably with the system prescribed in Deuteronomy, xvii, 8-13. Even in this case it is doubtful whether these judges and tribunals could in any satisfactorj' measure compare with the Babylonian legal system of the time of Ham- murabi. In Ezecniel's time (and this brings us down to the sixth century B. c.) the priests seem to have absorbed all administrative power, while the author of I Chronicles, evidently influenced by Ezechiel or Deuteronomy, tells us that David had appointed 6,000 Levites as judges, which is quite inadmissible. In the post-Exilic times, and during the Greek and Roman periods, reference is made to professional judges, local courts, and tribunals in all the cities of Israel, which was undoubtedly due to Babylonian, Persian, Greek, and Roman in- fluences.
Judicial or legal procedure was very simple in early Israel. In Exodus, xviii, 22, we are told that the elders appointed by Moses at Horeb were to judge the people "at all seasons"; and in Numbers. xxvii, 2 (cf. Exodus, xviii, 19 sqq.), we read that Moses rendered judgments before the tabernacle of Yahweh, where he sat with Aaron and the princes or elders of the congregation to teach statutes and give judgments. According to Deuteronomy, x.xi, 19; xxii, 15; and xxv, 7 (cf. Prov., xxii, 22; Amos, v. 11, 15; and Ruth, iv, 1, etc.), the judges in the cities had their seat at the gate, which was the thorough- fare of the public, or in the public squares of the city, where the markets were held, or in some other open place. Even the supreme judges administered justice in public; Deborah, for instance, under a palm-tree, and the kings at the gate, or in the court, of the royal palace. Solomon is said to have erected a porch, or hall of judgment, in Jerusalem, for his O'mi royal court of justice, and from Jeremiah we learn that in later times the princes of Judah ex- ercised judgment in a chamber of the roj-al palace. Jeremiah himself, when accused by the priests and false prophets, was judged by the princes of the people, who are said to have come out of the king's house into the temple to judge at the entrance of the new gate before the assembled people. The litigants, viz., the plaintiff and the defendant, ap- peared personally before the elders, and presented tjicir complaints orally. The accused, if not present, could be summoned to appear. Advocates are
