CHARITY
600
CHARITY
1 and 2; Q. cbcxxvii, a. 3). In spite of some occasional
exaggeration of the contemplative, and disparagement
of the active, life, the utility and dignity of labour have
never been more generally recognized than in the sec-
ond half of the Middle Ages. As to private property,
St. Thomas taught that, while it was useful and law-
ful, all superfluous goods should be used for social
purposes (II— II, Q. lxvi, a. 2). In no age has the
conception of ownership as a social trust been put
into practice by so large a proportion of the commu-
nity as during this period. For proof we need only
point to its innumerable and magnificent institutions,
foundations, and expenditures for the glory of God
and the service of mankind (cf. Ratzinger, op. cit.,
p. 392). .
There are certain serious and oft-repeated criticisms of Catholic charity in general and of medieval charity in particular which may be conveniently noticed at this point. They are all reducible to the general assertion that the Church's teaching concerning the meritorious character of almsgiving led to so much indiscriminate charity as to raise the question whether Catholic work on behalf of poverty was not produc- tive of more harm than good. With regard to this contention, the first observation to be made is that the Church did teach that charitable actions from the proper motive promoted the spiritual welfare of the giver, but that this was the teaching of Christ Him- self, as well as of the Christian authorities in every age (cf. Ratzinger, op. cit., pp. 89, 160, 388). If the doc- trine seems to have been more frequently and more strongly inculcated in the Middle Ages than in the first centuries of the Christian Era, the explanation is to be sought not merely in a lesser spirit of self-sacri- fice, but also in the more developed and systematic presentation of the theory, as well as in the fuller accounts which history has handed down to us con- cerning the beliefs and deeds of the later time. In the second place, the contention, or assumption, that the Church, or any of her authoritative exponents. ever taught that almsgiving was meritorious regard- less of the need of the recipient — in other words, that it is a good work to give the neighbour something which does him harm — is simply false. How could any sane and intelligent Christian defend the proposi- tion that an act of injury to the neighbour would win the favour of God? To Him the welfare of one man is as dear as that of another. If this a priori con- sideration seem inconclusive, let us cite the admis- sions of the economic historian, Professor Ashley: "It is not difficult to adduce a long catena of passages from the Fathers and from the canons of Councils, which declare in the most explicit fashion the duty of investigation" (op. cit., II, 315). In this way, he says, "Ehrle is able to make a very effective reply to the exaggerations of Emminghaus" (p. 369). His conclusion is: "It must be allowed that so far as the theory of almsgiving is concerned, the medieval Church was free from the fault that has been imputed to it. . ." (p. 316).
But the important question concerns neither the motives nor the doctrine of medieval charity, but its effectiveness in the relief of poverty. Here are three typical answers to this question: "... in the sphere of simple poverty it can hardly be doubted that the Catholic Church 1ms created more misery than it has I , ky. History of European Morals, II, 95, 3rd <<1.). "For eighteen centuries the charitable and legislative efforts of suci.ty have been pauperizing in- stead ol elevating men" (11. B. Adams, in Johns Hop- kins University Historical Studies, tilth series, p. 319).
"This [private charity], like the charity of the Church, was wholly ^discriminating and, therefore, evil in its consequences" (Charles A. Ellwood, in Henderson's Modern Methods of Charity, p. 167). In all probabil- ity these statements are a fairly adequate reflection of what is still the prevailing view outside the Cath-
olic Church. As a matter of simple fact, this view-
has never been justified by evidence; all the available
evidence tends to show that it is a gross exaggeration.
It seems to be due partly to prejudice, partly to a
priori inferences, ami partly to hasty generalizations
from isolated and inadequate data. That a large
part has been played by the element of religious preju-
dice, becomes clear when we reflect that most of the
descriptions of monastic corruption and incompetence
which have formed the original basis of the theory
under discussion, were written by men who were bit-
ter opponents of the monks, their religion, and their
institutions. In a considerable proportion of cases
(v. g. the case of Fuller, who is quoted below, and of
the King's Commissioners of 1535, quoted by Froude,
II, 434) their object was not so much to write history
as to discredit the old religion and the old regime.
Careful historians of to-day recognize this, but popu-
lar writers on the history of charity have not yet given
it sufficient attention. The other two causes of the
theory, illicit use of the a priori method and hasty
generalization, usually appear together, though now
one, now the other, predominates. A very common
misuse of the a priori method is seen in the contention
that the amount of begging, particularly unjustifiable
begging, in the Middle Ages was enormous. This
charge is based not so much upon statistics — which
are almost entirely wanting — nor upon authentic gen-
eral descriptions, as upon two assumptions: first, that
a good Catholic would give indiscriminately to all beg-
gars for the sake of the supernatural merit attached to
charitable actions; and second, that the practice of
begging was made honourable by the mendicant or-
ders, who employed it as their regular means of ob-
taining a livelihood. Again and again we meet with
this form of argument.
Of course Catholics have never believed that alms- giving which is not beneficial to the receiver could be spiritually helpful to the giver. Consequently belief in the meritorious character of works of charity no more necessarily leads to indiscriminate giving than belief in the virtue of mercy involves indiscriminate condoning of crime. Secondly, the fact that certain religious orders got their living and performed their charitable functions through begging, no more sanctified unworthy begging (which was always under the ban of the Church) to the people of the Middle Ages than the solicitations of clergymen and charity organizations, both of whom live by a species of beg- ging, justifies the general practice of mendicancy to our minds. Concerning generalizations from insufficient data, two instances will suffice. Emminghaus, whose work heads the list of authorities in many non- Catholic works, has, as Professor Ashley admits, misrepresented the position of the Church on meri- torious almsgiving, apparently because he did not study sufficiently the sources. If he has been guilty of such a fault concerning the theory of Catholic charity, need we be surprised to find that his gener- alizations about the practice and results are likewise based upon insufficient acquaintance with the sources? Ratzinger calls attention to several in- stances of this, and declares that the conclusions of Emminghaus with regard to charity in the early Church are due to unpardonable ignorance (op. cit., p. 93). Professor Ashley writes thus: "There are strong reasons for believing that for a couple of cen- turies at least before the Reformation, the English monasteries had done but little for the relief of poverty; . . . that, in the strong words of Fuller, 'the Abbeys dill but maintain the poor which they made'" (op. cit., II. p. 312). In proof of this Statement, he quotes two passages from Ratzinger
concerning the decline of the monastic system of re- lief on the Continent, and declares that the sa::te thing must have occurred in connexion with the English monasteries. In the first of the passages in
