DESCARTES
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DESCARTES
equally applicable to the known facts; observations
must then be multiplied until we discover some pecu-
liarity which determines our choice: and thus experi-
ment becomes a real means of verification (Principes,
4® partie). In every case experiment is, as it were,
the matter, while calculation becomes the form. In
the physical world there is nothing but motion and
extension, nothing but quantity. Everything can be
reduced to numerical proportions, and this reduction
is the final object of science. To understantl means
to know in terms of mathematics. When this final
stage is reached, intelligence and experience unite
in closest bonds: the intellect setting its seal on ex-
perience and endowing it with intelligibility.
Such is the method of Descartes. There remains to be seen what use he ma.kes of it. Recourse must be had to provisional doubt as the only means of distin- guishing the true from the false in the labyrinth of contradictory opinions which are lield in the schools and in the world at large. AVe must needs imitate those builders who, in order to erect a lofty structure, begin by digging deep, so that the foundations may be laid on the rock and solid ground (Remarques sur les 7^^ objections, ed. Charpentier, Paris; cf. Disc, de la m^thode, 3" partie). And this provisional doubt goes very deep indeed. We may reject the evidence of the senses for they are deceptive, "and it is but the part of prudence never to trust absolutely what has once deceived us" (V Meditation). We may even question whether there be "any earth or sky or other extended body " ; for, supposing that nothing of the sort exist, I can still have the impression of their existence as I had before ; this is plain from the phe- nomena of madness and dreams. What is more, the very simplest and clearest truths are not free from suspicion. " How do I know that God has not so ar- ranged it that I am deceived each time I add two and three together, or number the sides of a square, or form some judgment still more simple, if indeed anj^thing more simple can be imagined" (3 Meditation). What then remains intact? One thing only, the fact of my thought itself. But if I think it is because I exist, for from the one to the other of these terms we pass by simple inspection — Cogito, ergo sum: Behold the long-sought rock on which the edifice of knowledge must be built (Disc, de la meth., 4" partie, 2 M^d.). But how is this to be done? how are we to make our way out of the abyss into which we have descended? By analysing the basic fact, i. e. the content of our thought. I observe that, since my thought gropes amid doubt, I must be imperfect: and this idea calls forth this other, viz. of a being that is not imperfect, and therefore is perfect and infinite (Disc, de la meth., 4" partie). Let us consider this other idea. It must necessarily include existence, otherwise something would be wanting to it; it would not be perfect or infinite. Therefore, God exists, and "I know no less clearly and distinctly that an actual and eternal existence belongs to His nature than I know that whatever I can demonstrate of any figure or number belongs truly to the nature of that figure or number" (Disc, de la mdth., 4" partie; 5" M&lit. ; Rep. aux premieres obj.).
God, therefore, is known to us at the outset, the mo- ment we take the trouble to look into the nature of our own minds; and this is enough to eliminate the hypothesis of an evil genius that would take pleasure in deceiving us; it is enough also to secure the validity of all our deductions, whatever be their length, for "I recognize that it is impossible that He should ever de- ceive me, since in all fraud and ticccit there is a certain imperfection" (4® M^d.). Otherwise how would this idea of God be anything more tliau an idle f;incy? It has immensity; it has infinity, and therefore it must of itself be capable of existing. Spinoza, and after him Hegel, will teach that the possible infolds, as it were, an essential tendency to existence, and that this
tendency is greater in proportion as the possible is per-
fect. It is on this principle that they will build their
vast synthetic systems. Descartes anticipates them
and when closely pressed he replies just as do these
later philosophers. (R^p. aux premieres objections.)
It is a fact worth noting with reference to the genesis
of modern systems.
The presence in us of this idea of God must also be explained ; and here we find a new ray of light. The objective reality of our ideas must have some cause, and this is readily found when there is question of secondary qualities; these may be illusory or they may result from the imperfection of our nature. The question also can be solved without too much diffi- culty when it concerns primary qualities. May not these arise perchance from some depth of my own mental being that is beyond the control of my will? But such explanations are of no avail when we try to account for the idea of a being infinite and perfect. I myself am limited, finite; and from the finite, turn it about as we may, we can never derive the infinite; the lesser never gives us the greater (3® Med. cf. Princ, 7" partie). Considered from any and every point of view, the idea of God enlightens us as to His existence. Whatever the manner of our questioning, it gives us always from the depth of its fulness the one reply. Ego sum qui sum. Since then the veracity of God Himself guarantees our faculties in their nat- ural exercise, we may go forward in our inquiry; and the first question that meets us concerns the sub- ject in which the process of thought takes place, i.e. the soul. Understanding, conceiving, doubting, affirm- ing, denying, willing, refusing, imagining, feeling, desiring — these are the activities of what I call my soul. Now all these activities have one common quality: they cannot take place without thought or perception, without consciousness or knowledge. Thought then is the essential attribute of the soul. The s'oul is "a thing that thinks" (2^ M^d.; Princ, 1'^ partie), and it is nothing else. There is no sub- stratum underlying and supporting its various states; its whole being issues in each of its activities; thought and soul are equivalent (12® Regie).
Is thought, then, always in some mode of activity? Descartes leans to the belief that it is. "I exist", he says, " but for how long? Just as long as I am think- ing; for perhaps if I should wholly cease to think, I should at the same time altogether cease to be" (2' Med.). It is only with reluctance and under the pres- sure of objections that he concedes to the soul a sim- ple potcntia or power of thinking (5^^ Obj.); and, as may be easily seen, the concession is quite illogical. Thought, though in itself a unitary process, takes on different forms ; it begins with confused ideas or per- ceptions which require the co-operation of the body; such are the feelings of pleasure and pain, sensations, imagination, and local memory. Then the soul has clear and distinct ideas, which it begets and develops within itself as immanent activities. Under this head come the ideas of substance, duration, number, order, extension, figure, motion, thought, intelligence, and will (6® Med.; Princ, I).
These clear and distinct notions constitute of themselves the object of the understanding, and one may say that they are all involvetl in the idea of per- fect being. Whether I understand, or pass judgment, or reason, it is always that iilca which I perceive; and my understanding could have no other object, seeing that its sphere of action is always the infinite, the eter- nal and the necessary. To advance in knowledge is to progress in the knowledge of God Himself. (Rep. aux 2"^ obj.) But thought has another dominant form, viz. freedom. For Descartes this fimction of the mind is a fact "of which reason can never con- vince us", but one which "we experience in our- selves", and this fact is so evident " that it may be con- sidered one of the most generally known ideas" (R6p.
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