FATE
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FATE
however, he holds, is as objectionable as pain or physi-
cal corruption. The same fatalistic consequences to
morality are logically involved in the various forms of
recent pantheistic monism.
Modern Materialistic Fatalism. — Modern material- ism, starting from the notion of matter as the sole original cause of all things, endeavours to elaborate a purely mechanical theory of the universe, in which its contents and the cour.se of its evolution are all the necessary outcome of the original collocation of the material particles together with their chemical and physical properties and the laws of their action. The more thoroughgoing advocates of the mechanical theory, such as Clifford and Huxley, frankly accept the logical consequences of this doctrine that mind cannot act upon matter, and teach that man is " a con- scious automaton", and that thoughts and volitions exercise no real influence on the movements of mate- rial objects in the present world. Mental states are merely by-products of material changes, but in no way- modify the latter. They are also described as sul> jective aspects of nervous processes, and as epiphenom- ena, but however conceived they are necessarily held by the disciples of the materialistic school to be in- capable of interfering with the movements of matter or of entering in any way as efficient causes into the chain of events which constitute the physical history of the world. The position is in some ways more ex- treme than the ancient pagan fatalism. For, while the earlier writers taught that the incidents of man's life and fortune were inexorably regulated by an over- whelming power against which it was useless as well as impossible to strive, they generally held the common- sense view that our volitions do direct our immediate actions, though our destiny would in any case be realized. But the materialistic scientist is logically committed to the conclusion that while the whole series of our mental states are rigidly bound up with the nervous changes of the organism, which were all inexorably predetermined in the original collocation of the material particles of the universe, these mental states themselves can in no way alter the course of events or affect the movements of a single molecule of matter.
The Refutation of Fatalism of all types lies in the absurd and incredible consequences which they all entail. (1) .-Ancient fatalism implied that events were determined independently of their immediate causes. It denied free will, or that free will could affect the course of our lives. Logically it destroyed the basis of morality. (2) The fatalism resting on the Divine decrees (a) made man irresponsible for his acts, and (b) made God the author of sin. (.3) The fatalism of materialistic science not only annihilates morality but, logically reasoned out, it demands belief in the incredi- ble proposition that the thoughts and feelings of man- kind have had no real influence on human history.
Mill distinguished: (a) Pure or Oriental fatali.sm, which, he says, holds that our actions are not de- pendent on our desires, l)ut are overruled by a superior power; (b) modified fatalism, which teaches that our actions are determined by our will, and our will l)y our character and the motives acting on us — our charac- ter, however, having been given to us; (c) finally determinism, which, according to him, maintains that not only our conduct, but our character, is amenable to our will; and that we can improve our character. In both form.s of fatalism, he concludes, man is not responsible for his actions. But logicallj', in the de- terminist theory, if we reason the matter out, wc are driven to precisely the same conclusion. For the voli- tion to improve our character cannot arise unless as the necessary outcome of previous character and pres- ent motives. Practically there may be a difference between the conduct of the priifcsscd fatalist, who will be iMclincd to .say that as his future is always inflexibly predetermined there is no use in trying to alter it, and
the determinist, who may advocate the strengthening
of good motives. In strict consistency, however, since
determinism denies real initiative causality to the
individual human mind, the consistent view of life and
morahty should be precisely the same for the determin-
ist and the most e-xtreme fatalist (see Determinism).
For bibliography see Free Will.
Michael Maher.
Fate (Lat. faium, from fari, to tell or predict). This word is almost redundant in the vocabulary of a Cath- olic as such, for its meaning as the prime cause of events is lietter expressed by the term Divine Provi- dence, while, as a constant force at work in the physi- cal universe, it is nothing more nor less than natural law. Hence St. Augustine says (De Civit. Dei, c. i): " If anyone calls the influence or the power of God by the name of Fate, let him keep his opinion, but mend his speech. " Fate, in its popular meaning, is sometliing opposed to chance, in so far as the latter term implies a cause acting according to no fixed laws. The unseen power that rules the destinies of men was personified by the ancient Greeks under the name of Moira, or, more generally, as tliree sister Moirai, or Fates, whose names were Clotho, Lachesis, and Atro- pos. Sometimes fate is described as having unlimited sway over gods and men, while at other times the gods, especially Zeus, are described as the rulers of human destiny, or as having the power to change the course of fate. With the Moirai the Romans identi- fied their own Parcoe or Fata.
The idea of fate as a power in the world came, as St. Thomas tells us (C. G., Ill, xciii), from the attempt to find a cause for events which appeared to follow no definite law and to be the result of mere chance. Many, who were not satisfied with the explanation of poets and mythologists, turned their thoughts to the heav- enly bodies, which, acting according to definite and unchanging laws themselves, were supposed to im- press their influence upon events in the lower world (see Astrology). St. Thomas, who was no believer in astrology, evidently supposes that, while Providence acts according to fixed laws in the sidereal system, there is no such uniformity in the case of natural phe- nomena on earth. These latter are therefore often the result of chance, as far as secondary causes are concerned, though not so in their relation to God's Providence.
Early Speculations. — The Greek Philosopher Diodorus of lasus tried to prove the universality of fate by an argument from the truth of possibles (.Trepl SvvaTuiii). The contention was that no event can happen unless it was eternally true that it was going to happen. The truth of such a proposition cannot be changetl, and therefore the event to which it refers must necessarily take place. It is something like the argument which St. Augustine employs to demon- strate the eternal intellect of God; but the fallacy of it as regards Fate is pointed out by Cicero (De Fato IX 18, 19), who shows that the truth of the proposition depends on the actuality of the event. The defiuitiim which Cicero puts into the mouth of his brother t^uiu- tus identifies Fate with the necessity of natural law (De Divinatione I,!>'>, par. 125). His words are: " Fatum auteni id appello quod Gra^ci eliiap/i4vriv, id est, ordinem seriemque causarum, quum causa causa; nexa rem ex se gignat", or, as we should say, fate is the result of natural law in the physical world. Cicero himself, however, says further on (ibid., II, 3, par. 6), " What is theu.se of maintaining the exi.stence of Fate when, without Fate, an explanation of every- thing may be found in Nature or Fortune?"
The doctrine of fate held an important position in the monistic system of the Stoics. Its universal ex- istence was a logical consequence of their assumptions with regard to the physical universe, for they recog- nized nothing that was not ultimately reducible to
