HELL
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HELL
able. The WTath of God abideth on the damned (John,
iii, 36); they are vessels of Divine wrath (Rom., ix,
22) ; they shall not possess the Kingdom of God (I
Cor., vi, 10; Gal. v, 21), etc. The objections adduced
from- Scripture against this doctrine are so meaning-
less thit they are not worth while discussing in detail.
The teaching of the Fathers is not less clear and deci-
sive (cf. Petavius, "De Angelis", III, viii). We
merely call to mind the testimony of the martyrs who
often declared that they were glad to suffer pain of
brief duration in order to escape eternal torments;
3. g. "Martyrium Polycarpi", c. ii (cf. Atzberger,
"Geschichte", II, 612 sqc|.). It is true that Origen
fell into error on this pomt; but precisely for this
error he was condemned by the Church (Canones adv.
Origenem ex Justiniani libro adv. Origen., can. ix;
Hardouin, III, 279 E; Denz., n. 211). In vain at-
tempts were made to undermine the authority of these
canons (cf . Diekamp, " Die origenistischen Streitig-
keiten", Miinster, 1899, 137). Besides, even in Ori-
gen we find the orthodox teaching on the eternity of
the pains of hell; for in his works the faithful Chris-
tian was again and again victorious over the doubting
philosopher. Gregory of Nyssa seems to have fa-
voured the errors of Origen; many, however, believe
that his statements can be shown to be in harmony
with CathoHc doctrine. But the suspicions that have
been cast on some passages of Gregory of Nazianzus
and Jerome are decidedly without justification (cf.
Pesch, " Theologische Zeitfragen", 2nd series, 190
sqq.). The Church professes her faith in the eternity
of the pains of hell in clear terms in the Athanasian
Creed (Denz., nn. 40), in authentic doctrinal decisions
(Denz., nn. 211, 410, 429, 807, 835, 915), and in count-
less passages of her liturgy; she never prays for the
damned. Hence, beyond the possiliility of doubt, the
Church expressly teaches the eternity of the pains of
hell as a truth of faith which no one can deny or call in
question without manifest heresy.
But what is the attitude of mere reason towards this doctrine? Just as God must appoint some fixed term for the time of trial, after which the just will enter into the secure possession of a happiness that can never again be lost in all eternity, so it is likewise appropri- ate that after the expiration of that term the wicked will be cut off from all hope of conversion and happi- ness. For the malice of men cannot compel God to prolong the appointed time of probation and to grant them again and again, without end, the power of deciding their lot for eternity. Any obligation to act in this manner would be unworthy of God, because it would make Ilim dependent on the caprice of human malice, would rob His threats in great part of their efficacy, and would offer the amplest scope and the strongest incentives to human presumption. God has actually appointed the end of this present life, or the moment of death, as the term of man's probation. For in that moment there takes place in our life an essential and momentous change; from the state of union with the body the soul passes into a life apart. No other sharply defined instant of our life is of like importance. Hence we must conclude that death is the end of our probation ; for it is meet that our trial should terminate at a moment of our existence so prominent and significant as to be easily perceived by every man. Accordingly, it is the belief of all people that eternal retribution is dealt out immediately after death. This conviction of mankind is an additional proof of our thesis. — Finally, the preservation of moral and social order would not be sufficiently pro- vided for, if men knew that the time of trial were to be continued after death.
Many believe that reason cannot give any conclu- sive proof for the eternity of the pains of hell, but that it can merely show that this doctrine does not involve any contradiction. Since the Church has made no decision on this point, each one is entirely free to em- VII.— 14
brace this opinion. As is apparent, the author of this
article does not hold it. We admit that God might
have extended the time of trial beyond death; how-
ever, had He done so, He would have permitted man to
know about it, and would have made corresponding
provision for the maintenance of moral order in this
life. We may further admit that it is not intrinsically
impossible for God to annihilate the sinner after some
definite amount of punishment; but this would be less
in conformity with the nature of man's immortal soul;
and, secondly, we know of no fact that might give us
any right to suppose God will act in such a manner.
The objection is made that there is no proportion between the brief moment of sin and an eternal punishment. But why not? We certainly admit a proportion between a momentary good deed and its eternal reward, not, it is true, a proportion of duration, but a proportion between the law and its appropriate sanction. Again, sin is an offence against the infinite authority of God, and the sinner is in some way aware of this, though but imperfectly. Accordingly there is in sin an approximation to infinite malice which deserves an eternal punishment. Finally, it must be remembered that, although the act of sinning is brief, the guilt of sin remains forever; for in the next life the sinner never turns away from his sin by a sincere con- version. It is further objected that the sole object of punishment must be to reform the evil-doer. This is not true. Besides punishments inflicted for correc- tion, there are also punishments for the satisfaction of justice. But justice demands that whoever departs from the right way in his search for happiness shall not find his happiness, but lose it. The eternity of the pains of hell responds to this demand of justice. And, besides, the fear of hell does really deter many from sin; and thus, in as far as it is threatened by God, eternal punishment also serves for the reform of morals. But if God threatens man with the pains of hell. He must also carry out His threat if man does not heed it by avoiding sin. — For solving other objections it should be noted: (1) God is not only infinitely good. He is infinitely wise, just, and holy. (2) No one is cast into hell unless he has fully and entirely deserved it. (3) The sinner perseveres forever in his evil dis- position. (4) We must not consider the eternal pun- ishment of hell as a series of separate or distinct terms of punishment, as if God were forever again and again pronouncing a new sentence and inflicting new penal- ties, and as if He could never satisfy His desire for vengeance. Hell is, especially in the eyes of God, one and indivisible in its entirety; it is but one sentence and one penalty. We may represent to ourselves a punishment of indescribable intensity as in a certain sense the equivalent of an eternal punishment; this may help us to see better how God permits the sinner to fall into hell — how a man who sets at naught all Divine warnings, who fails to profit by all the patient forbearance God has shown him, and who in wanton disobedience is absolutely bent on rushing into eternal punishment, can be finally permitted by God's just indignation to fall into hell.
In itself, it is no rejection of Catholic dogma to sup- pose that God might at times, by way of exception, Uberate a soul from hell. Thus some argued from a false interpretation of I Peter, iii, 19 sq., that Christ freed several damned souls on the occasion of His descent into hell. Others were misled by untrust- worthy stories into the belief that the prayers of Gregory the Great rescued the Emperor Trajan from hell. But now theologians are unanimous in teaching that such exceptions never take place and never have taken place, a teaching which should be accepted. If this be true, how can the Church pray in the Offertory of the Mass for the dead: " Libera animas omnium fidelium defunctorum de poenis inferni et de profundo lacu" etc.? Many think the Church uses these words to designate purgatory. They can be explained more
