HERMES
278
HERMES
Kant, who treated the acknowledgment of God's
existence as a postulate of practical reason.
The knowledge of the existence of God and of His attributes, which determine His relation to the world and to mankind, is a preliminary condition indispen- sable to the solution of the question as to whether supernatural revelation is possible. Hermes answers this question in the affirmative, first, because God is able directly to proiluce representations in the human mind, and secondly, liecause by means of representa- tions man can be convinced of the intrinsic truth of conceptions supernaturally imparted to him, and also of conceptions naturally produced by himself, the truth of which he cannot himself demonstrate (cf. Philosophische Einleitung, § 74) . The question of the fact of a supernatural revelation must be distin- guished from the question of its possibility. Revela- tion, said Hermes, must be admitted as a fact so soon as it can be shown that a message has emanated super- naturally from God. But the duty of the practical reason to admit revelation as a fact is demonstrated if in any alleged Divine revelation all the conditions are present on fulfilment of which it can and must be accepted for what it purports to be. Hermes, how- ever, deems it necessary to make a very questionable distinction between philosophers and non-philosophers in regard to the duty of accepting revelation. No precept of practical reason, he says, can oblige the philosopher, who has a well-founded confidence in his knowledge, to accept a revelation that was imparted to him supernaturally, even if he had ascertained its supernatural character, and even if it fulfilled all the conditions of a Divine origin. For the philosopher can through his own discerning perceive very defi- nitely his natural duties, and he will always be con- vinced that he does so ]3erceive them. Consequently, practical reason cannot oblige him to look for this perception outsitle of himself, or to accept it if offered to him unsought, whether by another person or Ijy superhuman agency.
On the other hantl, when a revelation known to be supernatural is offered to a person unversed in phi- losophy, he is bound by practical reason to accept it in order that he may learn his natural obligations. He must accept it, since he could not otherwise ac- quire the sum total of needful knowledge, being unable to attain it Ijy philosophical methods. If, how- ever, it is incumbent on the great majority of man- kind — consisting, of course, of non-philosophers — to obey the behests of practical reason by believing in revelation, then neither can the philosopher refuse to accept the truth of revelation; reflective theoretical reason oljliges him to accejit it. At the most he could refuse to do so only on the ground that he had not yet been convinced of its Divine origin, since the fact that it could not be of any advantage to him would be no reason for withholding his acquiescence in its Divine origin. In order, therefore, to deny this certainty of the Divine origin of revelation, he must assume that what others, millions in fact, are in strictest duty bound to assume as true may possibly be untrue, and that obligatory reason when it leads mankind of absolute necessity to believe something to be true can guide them to the opposite of objective truth. Hermes' rationalistic conception of the idea of revelation follows from this line of argument; and furthermore he says expressly that reason cannot teach the ex- istence of truths of such primary importance and yet declare that it is unable to know them.
Again, Hermes' opinions on the motiva credibili- tatis were quite absurd. Theoretical reason, he said, can accept the probafjility of (he Divine origin of extraordinary phenomena (miracles and prophecies) only because it does not know all the laws of the natural world, while practical reason, for the sake of duty, can accept their supernatural origin as cer- tainly true. Theoretical reason, for example, could
not assert with certainty that the revival of a decom-
posing corpse was of supernatural origin, whereas
practical reason could. For, if such a phenomenon
eould have a natural cause, men should be allowed to
act accordingly and, in this case, to delay the burial
of the corpse because the possibility of a natural
reanimation was as yet by no means excluiled. In
this way Hermes sought to demonstrate the moral
duty of accepting miracles under certain circum-
stances, in opposition to Kant who hafi laitl it down as
a moral principle never to presuppose the miraculous.
Furthermore, Hermes denied that miracles afforded
conclusive testimony in favour of revelation; he dis-
tinguished between the proof of the supernaturalness
of miracles and the proof of the Divinity of a reve-
lation. That many of the supernatural miracles
worked by higher intelligent powers are of Di\'ine
origin can only be proved by the contents of the
revelation and its moral character. A revelation
shown to be genuine to the satisfaction of practical
reason demonstrates the Divinity of the miracles.
According to Hermes, the starting-point and chief principle of every science, and hence of theology also, is not only methodical doubt, but positive doubt. One can believe only what one has perceived to Ije true from reasonable grounds, and consequently one must have the courage to continue doubting until one has found reliable grounds to satisfy the reason. We may follow only where reason leads us, because this is the only guide that the Author of our being has given us for this life. Hermes differentiated the lliizins- glaiihc, or belief of the heart, i. e. the accepting of revealed truths dictated by the will, from the Ver- nuiifti/ldiibr, or belief of the reason, Ijrought aliout bv scientific demonstration. "In order that one's faith may be efficacious it is not enough", he says, "for the intellect, impelled tjy the laws of our cognitive faculties, to acquiesce in the evidence of all these truths which reason or revelation teaches or estab- lishes, nor to adhere firmly to the same in conse- quence, but it is also required that men should sur- render themselves to these truths (realities). Effi- cacious faith is not the faith dictated by reason, which is subject to necessity and can, therefore, be demon- strated, but the faith of the heart, that cannot be compelled by any proof, but is accepted by a free, unconditional surrender of the will. It is for reason to prevent us from believing blindly or in a visionary way, but it is for the will as a free agent to impel us to work by faith" (Christkatholische Dogmatik, III, § 285).
Although he was absolutely lacking in originality as a philosopher, and although as a theologian his acquaintance with the traditional theology was very limited, Hermes soon acquired a following. In philosophy there were Esser, Biunde, and Elvonich; in ethics G. Braun and Vogelsang; in natural and ecclesiastical law Droste-Hulshoff, all of whom treated their .subjects according to the Hermesian way of thinking, while Achterfeldt and Siemers wrote for use in the higher schools textbooks of religious instruc- tions incorporating his views. Among his other disciples were Baltzer, Hilgers, Rosenbaum, and J. W. J. Braun. The last-named, together with Achterfeldt, founded the "Zeitschrift fiir Philosophic und katho- hsche Theologie" (18.32-52) in defence of Hermes' ideas. The Archbishop of Cologne, Baron von Spie- gel, continued to champion Hermesianism even after the death of its author, and he silenced by repeated favourable reports the doubts that had been awakened in Rome as to the correctness of the new doctrine.
Hitherto only individual attacks had been made on the Hermesian theology. With the exception of a few anonymous articles in Mastiaux's "Literatur- zeitung" (1820, p. 369-394), and in the "A.schaffen- burger Kirchenzeitung", Windischmann was the first to write an incisive and thorough criticism of
