HOPE-SCOTT
467
HOPE-SCOTT
It would follow that the act of hope is incompatible
with such a state, since it postulates precisely a desire
for God, not only because He is good in Himself, but
also and formally because He is our adequate and
final good. Hope is less perfect than charity, but that
admission does not involve a moral deformity of any
kind, still less is it true that we can or ought to pass
our lives in a quasi uninterrupted act of pure love of
God. As a matter of fact, there is no such state
anywhere identifiable, and if there were it would not
be inconsistent with Christian hope.
The question as to the necessity of hope is followed with some natural sequence by the inquiry as to its certitude. Manifestly, if hope be absolutely required as a means to salvation, there is an antecedent pre- sumption that its use must in some sense be accom- panied by certainty. It is clear that, as certitude is properly speaking a predicate of the intellect, it is only in a derived sense, or as St. Thomas says participative, that we can speak of hope, which is largely a matter of the will, as being certain. In other words, hope, whose office is to elevate and strengthen our wills, is said to share the certitude of faith, whose abiding place is our intellects. For our purpose it is of im- portance to recall what it is that, being apprehended by our intellect, is said to do service as the foundation of Christian hope. This has already been determined to be the concept of God as our helper gathered from reflecting on His goodness, mercy, omnipotence, and fidelity to' His promises. In a subordinate sense our hope is built upon our own merits, as the eternal reward is not forthcoming except to those who shall have employed their free will to co-operate with the aids afforded by God's bounty. Now there is a three- fold certitude discernible. (1) A thing is said to be certain conditionally when, another thing being given, the first infallibly follows. Supernatural hope is evi- dently certain in this way, because, granted that a man does all that is required to save his soul, he is sure to attain to eternal lite. This is guaranteed by the infinite power and goodness and fidelity of God. (2) There is a certainty proper to virtues in general in so far as they are principles of action. Thus for instance a really temperate man may be counted on to be uniformly sober. Hope being a virtue may claim this moral certainty inasmuch as it constantly and after an established method encourages us to look for eternal blessedness to be had by the Divine munificence and as the crown of our own merits accumulated through grace. (3) finally, a thing is certain absolutely, i. e., not conditionally upon the verification of some other thing, but quite indepen- dently of any such event. In this case no room for doubt is left. Is hope certain in this meaning of the word? So far as the secondary material object of hope is concerned, i. e. those graces which are at least remotely adequate for salvation, we can be entirely confident that these are most certainly provided. As to the primary material object of hope, namely, the face-to-face vision of God, the Catholic doctrine, as set forth in the sixth session of the Council of Trent, is that our hope is unqualifiedly certain if we consider only the Divine attributes, which are its support, and which cannot fail. If, however, we limit our attention to the sum total of salutary operation which we contribute and upon which we also lean as upon the reason of our expectation, then, prescinding from the case of an individual revelation, hope is to be pronounced uncertain. This is plainly for the reason that we cannot in advance insure ourselves against the weakness or the malice of our free wills.
This doctrine is in direct antagonism to the initial Protestant contention that we can and must be altogether certain of our salvation. The only thing required for this end, according to the teaching of the Reformers, was the special faith or confidence in the promises which alone, without good works, justified a
man. Hence, even though there were no good works
distinguishable in a person's earthly career, such an
one might and ought, notwithstanding, cherish a firm
hope, provided only that he tlid not cease to beUeve.
Assuming that the seat of hope is our will, we may ask whether, having been once infused, it can ever be lost. The answer is that it can be destroyed, both by the perpetration of the sin of despair, which is its formal opposite, and by the subtraction of the habit of faith, which assigns the motives for it. It is not so clear that the sin of presumption expels the super- natural virtue of hope, although of course it cannot coexist with the act. We need not be detained with the inquiry whether a man could continue to hope if his eternal damnation had been revealed to him. Theologians are agreed in regarding such a revelation as practically, if not absolutely, impossible. If, by an all but clearly absurd hypothesis, we suppose Al- mighty God to have revealed to anyone in advance that he was surely to be lost, such a person obviously could no longer hope. Do the souls in Purgatory hope? It is the commonly held opinion that, as they have not yet been admittetl to the intuitive vision of God, and as there is nothing otherwise in their con- dition which is at variance with the concept of this virtue, they have the habit and elicit the act of hope. As to the damned, the concordant judgment is that, as they have been tleprived of every other super- natural gift, so also knowing well the perpetuity of their reprobation, they can no longer hope. With reference to the Ijlessetl in heaven, St. Thomas holds that, possessing what they have striven for, they can no longer be said to have the theological virtue of hope. The words of St. Paul (Rom., viii, 24) are to the point: " For we are saved by hope. But hope that is seen, is not hope. For what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" They can .still desire the glory which is to be proper to their risen bodies and also, by reason of the bonds of charity, they can wish for the salvation of others, but this is not, properly speaking, hope. The human Soul of Christ furnishes an example. Because of the hypostatic union It was already enjoying the beatific vision. At the same time, because of the passible nature with which He had clothed Himself, He was in the state of pil- grimage {in statu viatoris), and hence He could look forward with longing to His assumption of the qualities of the glorified body. This however was not hope, because hope has as its main object union with God in heaven.
WiLHELM AND Sc.\NNELL, Manual of Dogmatic Theology (London. 1909): Mazzella. De Virtutihus Infusis (Rome, 1884); Slater, Manual of Moral Theology (New York, 1908); St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica (Turin, 1S85); Bal- LERiNi, Opus Theologicum Morale (Prato, 1901).
Joseph F. Delany.
Hope-Scott (originally Hope), James Robert, parliamentary barrister, Q.C.; b. 15 July, 1812, at Great Marlow, Berkshire, England; d. in London, 29 April, 1873; third son of the Honourable Sir Alexan- der Hope, G.C.B., who was fourth son of John, second Earl of Hopetoun, a Scottish title dating from 1703. His mother was third and youngest daughter of Geoige Brown of Ellerton, Roxburghshire. During early childhood his home was the Military College at Sandhurst, where his father was in command. Afterwards he went abroad with his parents, staying in succession at Dresden, Lausanne, and Florence, and thus gaining a mastery of the German, French, and Italian tongues. In 1825 he entered Eton, whence, in 1828, he matriculated at Christ Church, Oxford. After a visit to Paris in 1829 he went into residence at Oxford the same year. The degree of B..4. he took in 1832, coming out in the fourth class in Uteris humanioribus. Next year he was elected a Fellow of Merton. In 1835 he gave up his intention of entering the ministry of the Established Church,
