IMAGINATION
673
IMAGINATION
determine whether the image tends naturally to ex-
ternalize itself, i. e. whether the image if left to itself
would picture its object as existing outside the mind.
This has been denied at times, on account of the
probable distinction between the perception and the
image, and also because a complete image is a rare
occurrence. Are we to admit that a generic or sche-
matic image could externalize itself? To admit this
would not settle the question; it is, rather, proba-
ble that every image would project itself were it not
inhibited by some other influence. It is, indeed, diffi-
cult to recognize in a dream anything else than the
play of images. For the animal as well as for man, a
dream manifestly runs its course in exterior space, and
provokes acts, which, if the externalizing of images be
denied, are quite incomprehensible. This theory is
supported by the characteristics of hallucination,
which also throw some light on the mechanism of
inhibition. In the case of hallucination the image,
even though corrected by reason, represents its object
as existing in exterior space. We must remark, fur-
ther, that hallucination takes place in cases of extreme
fatigue or when certain cerebral centres appear to be
paralyzed by poison. It is possible, of course, to refer
the phenomenon not to paralysis but to toxic stimvda-
tion. But such a solution seems to be excluded by the
manner in which we seize on the subconscious elements
and by the circumstances in which these elements
come to the surface. Pseudo-hallucination offers a
form intermediate between the totally inhibited image
and hallucination. At times the objects appear with
wonderful clearness making us almost feel their pre.s-
ence ; but the space they occupy does not correspond
with external space, nor have they any spatial relation
with the objects which we perceive by our senses.
They occur most naturally when one is dreaming or in
a half-awakened state; and it is well-known that they
are due to fatigue or to the suspension of critical rea-
son and voluntary intellectual activity. It is conse-
quently when the image is most intense and when
another function, especially critical reason, is in abey-
ance, that images display a tendency to externalize
themselves, and, sometimes, are actually externalized.
It seems therefore that, normally, the image would be
projected, if no other factor intervened. An analysis
of normal perception leads to the same conclusion.
This, we know, is the outcome both of sensory impres-
sions and of the images that we externalize. What the
latter contribute is, it seems to us, just as objective as
what is contributed by the sensory impressions.
There may be another way of interpreting the phe-
nomenon; but when we consider it in conjunction
with the facts just mentioned, it seems necessary to
admit that, normally, the image externalizes itself.
Psychologists often raise the question why certain states of consciousness, such as perception, give us the impression of the external presence of an object. Probably this impression is a primordial characteristic and, from a psychological point of view, it would be more natural to enquire why images, in certain cases, are devoid of that characteristic. Of course, that is no solution of the philosophical problem concerning the objective value of our faculties; but the fact is of considerable importance in the domain of experi- mental psychology. The only possible answer to the question seems to be as follows: the image is inhibited and appears as subjective whenever its externalization would produce incoherence in the things perceived. It is quite certain that children, possessing less of the critical sense and fewer acquired associations, readily believe " whatever comes into their heads " ; and again great fatigue, drunkenness, and other states of the sort which are evidently obstacles to the action of reason are precisely the conditions in which images have the greatest tendency to externalize themselves.
In normal circumstances there is always some spe- cial note in the image or in the thing perceived which VII.— 43
prevents them from corresponding exactly. Dis-
agreements therefore appear which force us to place
images in a category distinct from that of perceptions,
and our acquired associations convince us that they
belong to the unreal, or at least less real, world of the
conscious subject. This view is corroborated by the
phenomenon of normal perception. The data of sense
stir up through association images that complete
them ; the latter, then, must be in perfect accord with
the former, and, as a matter of fact, we know that we
externalize them spontaneously. In dreams we pro-
ject into outer space incoherent images, but frequent
observation shows that we co-ordinate and complete
them, arranging them in a logical whole. It would
seem then most likely that along with this coherence
we produce their illusory externaUzation. It is well
known how suddenly fantastic images disappear as
soon as we recognize their absurdity. There seems to
be no doubt then that images of their own nature tend
to externalize themselves, and they do so as long as no
conflict results therefrom. It will be urged, perhaps,
that we are not conscious of this rational criticism
demonstrating the logical impossibility of externaliz-
ing the images; to this we rejoin that analytic reason
intervenes m exceptional cases only, and that it is
nearly always a question of simple acquired associa-
tions. Dogs and cats, without an inkling of the princi-
ple of causality, seek the cause of sensible phenomena.
In like spontaneous fashion we inhibit or suppress our
subjective images when they differ too widely from
reahty.
The Motive Force op Images. — It is well known that an image inclines to action, and Ribot has for- mulated the general law that "every image tends to its own realization ". If external action does not always reveal all the images that arise in consciousness, the reason is that many of them are neutralized by antagonistic images, which, owing to the character of their object, tend to issue in actions of an opposite sort. This motive force of images makes itself felt at every moment of our lives; but it shoidd be observed that ordinarily it acts only through an emotional state and perhaps, as scholastic philosophers maintain, by means of a special "locomotive " faculty. Be that as it may, it seems to be proved that, in order to influence action and movements, images need not necessarily be in consciousness, much less at its focus. "Marginal" images, or even totally subconscious images, can act on our members and produce at times very complex movements. It would be an error to think that this occurs only exceptionally and in abnormal conditions; nevertheless it is through the practices of spiritism, table turning, automatic writing, etc., that special attention has been drawn to it and the most striking examples of it offered to the psychologist. The "mo- tive force " of images is only a particular instance of a law so general that it dominates the whole psychic life. Each psychic state, wherever it may occur in the human person, tends to spread over adjacent areas and thereby produce equilibrium, i. e. the harmonious condition of the whole personality. An image caus- ing a muscular contraction illustrates this diffusion in a very striking way, and that is why it has been ob- served sooner and formulated in a more precise man- ner than any other.
Elaboration op Images by the Intellect. — The image is the starting point and in some measure the immediate matter of all our intellectual operations. It is certain that any cessation of imaginative activity puts an end at once to intellectual function; and since these two faculties, imagination and intelligence, are subjectively distinct, this dependence must be of an objective sort, i. e. the intellect borrows from the imagination. An analysis of our higher knowledge, even the most abstract, gives this explanation all the corroboration that immediate experience can furnish. The ideas of the most spiritual things, such as God or
