INDIVIDUALISM
761
INDIVIDUALISM
last traces of the religious knowledge of former times
were all but disappearing from those portions of the
world in which the intellect had been active and had
a career" (Apologia, chap. v). These words might
stand with but little modification as a description of
present-tlay conditions where the rationalistic spirit is
in control. The only effective barrier to resist its
trinraphant march, leading scepticism in its train, is
tlie principle of authority embodied in the Catholic
Church.
See the various theological treatises De Religione; for the necessity of reUgion, Hettinger, NatuTal Religion (New Yorli, 1890); ScH.^NZ, A Chrislian Apology (New York, liiOl); Bal- four, The Foundation of Belief (London, 1895); Lilly, On Right and \]^rong (London, 1S92): De Lamennais, Essai 8ur L' indifference en matiere de religion (Paris, 1859). For Liberal ladifferentlsm, Newman, The Difficulties of Latitudinarianism in Tracts for the Times, Vol. V, No. 8.5. This lecture will be found also in Discussions and Arguments (London, 1S91); Apologia pro vita sua, ch. v, passim; Address delivered in Rome on his il, rot/on to the Cardinalate in Addresses to Cardinal New- imin and /ns Replies, ed. Neville (London, 190.5); McLaughlin, Is one reU(ii,>n as good as another? (London, 1891); Manning, On the Perpctmd Office of the Council of Trent in Sermons on Ec- clesiastical Subjects, III (London, 1873).
James J. Fox.
Individualism. — A comprehensive and logical defi- nition of this term is not easy to obtain. Individ- ualism is not the opposite of socialism, except in a very general and incomplete way. The definition given in the Century Dictionary is too narrow: "That theory of government which favours non- interference of the iState in the affairs of individuals." This covers only one form of individualism, namely, political or civic. Perhaps the following will serve as a fairly satisfactory description: The tendency to magnify individual liberty, as against external au- thority, and individual activity, as against associated activity. Under external authority are included not merely political and religious governments, but vol- untary associations, and such forms of restraint as are found in general standards of conduct and belief. Thus, the labourer who refuses on theoretical grounds to become a member of a trade union; the reformer who rejects social and political methods, and relies upon measures to be adopted by each individual acting independently; the writer who discards some of the recognized canons of his art; the man who regards the pronouncements of his conscience as the only standard of right and wrong; and the free- thinker — are all as truly individualists as the Evan- gelical Protestant or the philosophical anarchist. Through all forms of individualism runs the note of emphasis upon the importance of self in opposition to either restraint or assistance from without. Indi- vidualism is scarcely a principle, for it exhibits too many degrees, and it is too general to be called a theory or a doctrine. Perhaps it is better described as a tendency or an attitude.
The chief recognized forms of indivitlualism are religious, ethical, and political. Religious individ- ualism describes the attitude of those persons who refuse to subscribe to definite creeds, or to submit to any external religious authority. Such are those who call themselves freethinkers, and those who profess to believe in Christianity without giving their adhesion to any particular denomination. In a less extreme sense all Protestants are individualists in religion, inas- much as they regard their individual interpretation of the Bible as the final authority. The Protestant who places the articles of faith adopted by his denomina- tion before his own private interpretation of the teaching of Scripture is not, indeed, a thorough-going individualist, but neither is he a logical Protestant. On the other hand. Catholics accept the voice of the Church as the supreme authority, and therefore reject outright the principle of religious individualism.
Ethical individualism is not often spoken of now, and the theories which it describes have not many professed adherents. Of course, there is a sense in
which all men are etliical individualists, that is, inas-
much as they hold the voice of conscience to be the
immediate rule of conduct. But ethical individual-
ism means more than this. It means that the indi-
vidual conscience, or the individual reason, is not
merely the decisive subjective rule, but that it is the
only rule; that there is no objective authority or
standard which it is bound to take into account.
Among the most important forms of the theory are
the intuitionism, or common-sense morality, of the
Scottish School (Hutchinson, Reid, Ferguson, and
Smith), the autonomous morality of Kant, and all
those systems of Hedonism which make individual
utility or pleasure the supreme criterion of right and
wrong. At present the general trend of ethical theory
is away from all forms of individualism, and toward
some conception of social welfare as the highest stand-
ard. Here, as in the matter of religion, Catholics
are not individualists, since they accept as the su-
preme rule, the law of Cod, and as the final interpreter
of that law, the Church. Considered historically
and in relation to the amount of attention that it
receives, the most important form of individualism
is that which is called political. It varies in degree
from pure anarchism to the theory that the State's
only proper functions are to maintain order and
enforce contracts. In ancient Greece and Rome,
political theory and practice were anti-individualistic;
for they considered and made the State the supreme
good, an end in itself, to which the individual was a
mere means.
Directly opposed to this conception was the Chris- tian teaching that the individual soul had an inde- pendent and indestructible value, and that the State was only a means, albeit a necessary means, to indi- vidual welfare. Throughout the Middle Ages, there- fore, the ancient theory was everywhere rejected. Nevertheless the prevailing theory and practice were far removed from anything that could be called individ- ualism. Owing largely to the religious individualism resulting from the Reformation, political individualism at length appeared: at first, partial in the writings of Hobbes and Locke; later, complete in the specu- lations of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century, notably Rousseau. The general conclusion from all these writings was that government was something artificial, and at best a necessary evil. .\ccording to the Social Contract theory of Rousseau, the State was merely the outcome of a compact freely made by its individual citizens. Consequently they were under no moral obligation to form a State, and the State itself was not a moral necessity. These views are no longer held, except by profes- sional anarchists. In fact, a sharp reaction has oc- curred. The majority of non-Catholic ethical and political writers of to-day approach more or less closely to the position of ancient Greece and Rome, or to that of Hegel; society, or the State, is an organism from which the individual derives all his rights and all his importance. The Catholic doc- trine remains as always midway between these extremes. It holds that the State is normal, natural, and necessary, even as the family is necessary, but that it is not necessary for its own sake; that it is only a means to individual life and progress.
Moderate political individualists would, as noted above, reduce the functions of the State to the mini- mum that is consistent with social order and peace. As they view the matter, there is always a presump- tion against any intervention by the State in the affairs of individuals, a presumption that can be set aside only by the most evident proof to the contrary. Hence they look upon such activities as education, sumptuary regulations, legislation in the interest of health, morals, and professional competency, to say nothing of philanthropic measures, or of industrial restrictions and industrial enterprises, as outside the
