Page:Catholic Encyclopedia, volume 8.djvu/59

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INQUISITION


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INQUISITION


Church was bound to insist that he should possess, in ii pro-eminent degree, the qualities ot a good judge; that he should be animated with a glowing zoal for the Faith, the salvation of souls, and the ex- tirpation of heresy; that amid all difficulties and dangers he should never yield to anger or passion; that he should meet hostility fearlessly, but should not court it; that he should jdeld to no inducement or threat, and yet not be heartless; that, when cir- cumstances permitted, he should observe mercy in allotting penalties; that he should listen to the counsel of others, and not trust too much to his own opinion or to appearances, since often the probable is untrue, and the truth improbable. Somewhat thus did Bernard Gui (or Guidonis) and Eymeric, both of them inquisitors for years, describe the ideal inquisitor. Of such an inquisitor also was Gregory IX tloubtlessly thinking when he urged Conrad of Marljurg: "ut puniatur sic temeritas perversorum quod innocentia? puritas non Itedatur"- — i.e., not to punish the wicked so as to hurt the innocent. His- tory shows us how far the inquisitors answered to this ideal. Far from being inhuman, they were, as a rule, men of spotless character and sometimes of truly admiralile sanctity, and not a few of them have been canonized by the Churcli. There is absolutely no reason to look on the medieval ecclesiastical judge as intellectually antl morally inferior to the modern judge. No one would deny that the judges of to- day, despite occasional harsh decisions and the errors of a few, pursue a highly honourable profes- sion. Similarly, the medieval inquisitors should be judged as a whole, and not by individual examples. Moreover, history does not justify the hypothesis that the medieval heretics were prodigies of virtue, ileserving our sympathy in advance.

(b) Procedure. — This regularly began with a • month's " term of grace ", proclaimed by the in- quisitor whenever he came to a heresy-ridden dis- trict. The inhabitants were summoned to appear liefore the inquisitor. On those who confessed of their own accord a suitable penance (e.g. a pilgrim- age) was imposed, but never a severe punishment like incarceration or surrender to the civil power. However, these relations with the resitlents of a place often fiu'nished important indications, pointed out the proper quarter for investigation, and some- times much evidence was thus obtained against in- dividuals. These were then cited before the judges — usually by the parish priest, although occasionally by the secular authorities — and the trial began. If the accused at once made full and free confession, the affair was soon concluded, and not to the disad- vantage of the accused. But in most instances the accused entered denial even after swearing on the Four Gospels, and this denial was stubborn in the measure that the testimony was incriminating. David of .'Vugsburg (cf . Preger, " Der Traktat des David von ."Vugsburg uber die Waldenser", Munich, 1S7S, pp. 43 sqq.) pointed out to the inquisitor four methods of extracting open acknowledgment: (i) fear of death, i. e. by giving the accused to under- stand that the stake awaited him if he would not confess; (ii) more or less close confinement, possibly emphasized by a curtailment of food; (iii) visits of tried men, who would attempt to induce free con- fession through friendly persuasion; (iv) torture, which will be discussed below.

(c) The Witnesses. — When no voluntary admission was made, evidence was adduced. Legally, there had to be at least two witnesses, although conscientious judges rarely contented themselves with that number. The principle had hitherto been held by the Church that the testimony of a heretic, an excommunicated person, a perjurer, in short, of an "infamous", was worthless before the courts. But in its detestation of unbelief the Church took the further step of abolishing


this long-established practice, and of accept ing a here- tic's evidence at nearly full value in trials concerning faith. This appears as early as the twelfth century in the " Decretum Gratiani ". While Frederick II read- ily assented to this new departure, the inquisitors seemed at first uncertain as to the value of the evi- dence of an "infamous" person. It w-as only in 1261, after Alexander IV had silenced their scruples, that the new principle was generally adopted both in theory and in practice. This grave modification seems to h;ive been defended on the groimd that the heretical conventicles took place secretly, and were shrouded in great obscurity, so that reliable information could be obtained from none but themselves. Even prior to the establishment of the Inquisition the names of the witnesses were sometimes withheld from the accused person, and this usage was legalized by Gregory IX, Innocent IV^, and Alexander IV. Boni- face VIII, however, set it aside by his Bull "Ut commissi vobis officii" (Sext. Decret., 1. V, tit. ii); and commanded that at all trials, even inquisitorial, the witnes.ses must be named to the accused. There was no personal confrontation of witnesses, neither was there any cross-examination. Witnesses for the de- fence hardly ever appeared, as they would almost in- fallibly be suspected of being heretics or favourable to heresy. For the same reason those impeached rarely secured legal advisers, and were therefore obliged to^ make personal response to the main points of a charge. ^ This, however, was also no innovation, for in 1205 Innocent III, by the Bull "Si adversus vos", for- bade any legal help for heretics: " We strictly prohibit you, lawyers and notaries, from assisting in any way, by council or support, all heretics and such as believe in them, adhere to them, render them any assist- ance or defend them in any way." But this severity soon relaxed, and even in Eymeric's day it seems to have been the universal custom to grant heretics a legal adviser, who, however, had to be in every way beyond suspicion, "upright, of undoubted loyalty, skilled in civil and canon law, and zealous for the faith."

Meanwhile, even in those hard times, such legal severities were felt to be excessive, and attempts were made to mitigate them in various ways, so as to pro- tect the natural rights of the accused. First he could make known to the judge the names of his enemies: should the charge originate with them, they would be quashed without further ado. Furthermore, it was imdoubtedly to the advantage of the accused that false witnesses were punished without mercy. The aforesaid inquisitor, Bernard Gui, relates an instance of a father falsely accusing his son of heresy. The son's innocence quickly coming to light, the false accuser was apprehended, and sentenced to prison for life {solatn vitam ei ex misericordia rdinqucnles) . In ad- dition he was pilloried for five consecutive Sundays before the church during service, with bare head and bound hands. Perjury in those days was accounted an enormous offence, particularly when committed by a false witness. Moreover, the accused had a consider- able advantage in the fact that the inquisitor had to conduct the trial in co-operation with the diocesan bishop or his representatives, to whom all documents relating to the trial had to be remitted. Both together, inquisitor and bishop, were also made to summon and consult a number of upright and experienced men (honi viri), and to decide in agreement with their de- cision (vota). Innocent IV (11 July, 1254), .Alexander IV (15 April, 12.55, and 27 .\pril. 1260), and Urban IV (2 August, 1264) strictly prescribed this institution of the bnni viri — i. e. the consultation in difficult cases of experienced men, well versed in theology and canon law, and in every way irreproachable. The docu- ments of the trial were either in their entirety handed to them, or at least an abstract drawn up by a public notary was furnished ; they were also made acquainted